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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE PAST YEAR resulted in a significant number of im-
portant aviation cases. The United States Supreme Court
has considered eight aviation cases during the past year and
at the time of this writing has rendered opinions in three of
the cases. The Supreme Court cases which have been de-
cided are Philko Aviation v. Shacket,' Aloha Airlines v. Director of
Taxation of Hawa'.42 and Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States.'3
The specific holdings in these cases and their possible effects
will be discussed in this article. The aviation cases currently
awaiting decision by the Supreme Court include Trans- World
103 S. Ct. 2476 (1983). See infra notes 9-28 and accompanying text.
104 S. Ct. 291 (1983). See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
103 S. Ct. 1033 (1983). See infra notes 162-167 and accompanying text.
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Airlines v. Franklin Mni Corp. ,4 Helcopteros Nacionales De Colum-
bia, SA. v. Hall,5 SA. Empresa De Viacao Aeraea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines) v. United States,6 Unted States v. Unied Scottish
Insurance Co.7 and Unied States v. Weber Aircraft Corp..' Each of
these cases will also be discussed in the appropriate sections of
this article.
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In an area of particular importance to aircraft finance, the
United States Supreme Court decided Philko Aviation v.
Shacket.9 The Court held that the aircraft recordation and
registration provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958"0
(Federal Aviation Act) require that a sale or transfer of ah
interest in an aircraft must be in the form of a writing prop-
erly filed for recording in the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) Aircraft Registry in order to be valid as to third
persons without notice." In Philko Aviation, an aircraft dealer,
Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, sold and delivered a new air-
plane to Mr. and Mrs. Shacket, gave them a photocopy of a
4 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), cerl. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3084 (1983). The case was
argued in November, 1983. For the Supreme Court's disposition, see tnfra note 303.
5 638 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1270 (1983). The case was
argued in November, 1983. For the Supreme Court's disposition, see infra note 71.
'; 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983). For the
Supreme Court's disposition, see infra note 178.
7 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983). The Court has
denied the respondents' motion for divided arguments in Varg Airhines and United Scot-
tz.h. United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. 60 (1983) (memorandum opinion).
The Ninth Circuit opinion in United Scottish was noted in Note, 46 J. AIR L. & COM.
525 (1981). For the Supreme Court's disposition, see infra note 178.
" 688 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983). For the Supreme
Court's disposition, see infra note 264.
103 S. Ct. 2476 (1983).
49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-08, 1321-25, 1341-59, 1371-89, 1401-06, 1421-32, 1441-42, 1461-
63, 1471-74, 1481-90, 1501-18, 1521-23, 1531-42 (1976).
Section 503(c) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1976) provides:
No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is provided for by
[§ 1403(a)(1)] shall be valid in respect of such aircraft . ..against any
person ...by whom the conveyance or other instrument is made or
given, his heir or devisee, or any person having actual notice thereof,
until such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation in the
office of the Secretary of Transportation.
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bill of sale, and advised them that it would "take care of the
paperwork," including the filing of the bill of sale in the FAA
Aircraft Registry.12 Unfortunately, Smith did not keep his
word and never filed the Shacket's bill of sale in the FAA
Aircraft Registry. Later, Smith executed another bill of sale
on the same plane to Philko Aviation, Inc. 13 Philko checked
the aircraft's title against the FAA records and thought that
it was acquiring good title. 4
After Smith's fraudulent acts were discovered, the Shack-
ets, having possession of the plane, filed a declaratory judg-
ment action in federal district court to determine title to the
plane. 5 The district judge ruled in favor of the Shackets. 6
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the ti-
tle to the aircraft had passed to the Shackets upon delivery of
possession pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) 7 in effect in Illinois."8
The Supreme Court held, however, that if Philko was an
innocent third party without notice of the prior sale to the
Shackets, the prior unrecorded transfer was not valid as to
Philko.' 9 The Court explained that the provisions of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act must be interpreted to provide that a trans-
fer of an interest in the aircraft shall not be valid as to third
persons without notice, unless a document evidencing the
transfer has been recorded in the FAA Aircraft Registry.2"
The Court further held that the Federal Aviation Act pre-
empted the state law which would have mandated that title
to the aircraft passed upon delivery by Roger Smith Aircraft
to the Shackets.2'
Philko Aviation, 103 S. Ct. at 2477.
Id. at 2477-78.
, Id. at 2478.
Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, 497 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
Id. at 1271. Philko grounded its position, that the first, unrecorded sale was inva-
lid, on the provisions of § 503(c) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c)
(1976). 497 F. Supp. at 1269-70. See supra note 11.
" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-401(2) (1962).
Shacket v. Philco Aviation, 681 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1982).
Philko Aviation, 103 S. Ct. at 2478.
Id.
Id. at 2481. Justice O'Connor was the only justice who did not join the opinion of
the Court, but she did concur in the judgment. Justice O'Connor joined the opinion
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In addition, the Supreme Court used Philko Aviation as a
vehicle to express its view on the issue of federal preemption
of state laws relating to priorities of interests in aircraft. The
issue of whether the Federal Aviation Act preempts state law
governing buyers in the ordinary course of business had cre-
ated a split of authority between various state and federal
courts. 22 During the time that Phi'lko Aviation was under con-
sideration, a petition for certiorari from the Fifth Circuit was
also pending in Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp.23
In Gary Aircraft, the Fifth Circuit held that the Federal Avia-
tion Act does not preempt the priority provisions of the
U.C.C. as enacted in Texas.24 The appeals court, therefore,
held that a security interest, for which a financing statement
had been properly filed for recording in the FAA Aircraft
Registry, did not have priority over the interest of a subse-
quent buyer in the ordinary course of business. 25  The
Supreme Court deferred any ruling on the petition for certio-
rari in Gary Aircraft until its decision in Philko Aviation.
Although the question of preemption of state laws dealing
with priorities of interests was squarely presented in Gary Air-
craft, the Court chose to address the issue in dicta in Phizlko
Aviation26 and denied the petition for certiorari in Gary Air-
"except to the extent that it might be read to suggest this court's endorsement of the
view that one who makes a reasonably diligent effort to record will obtain the protec-
tions ordinarily reserved for recorded interests." Id.
21 Compare, e.g., Sun Bank v. Snell (In re Cone), 11 Bankr. 925 (M.D. Fla. 1981) and
Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970)
(holding that the Federal Aviation Act preempts state priorities law), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 923 (1971) with Danning v. World Airways (In re Holiday Airlines), 647 F.2d 977
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146 (1982) and Bitzer-Croft Motors v. Pioneer
Bank & Trust Co., 82 11. App. 2d 1, 401 N.E.2d 1340 (1980) (holding that the Federal
Aviation Act does not preemept state priorities law). The split of authority is discussed
in Gagy Aircraft, 681 F.2d at 368-69.
- 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983).
2, Id. at 372.
2 , Id at 377.
2i The precise question presented to the Court in Philko Aviation was: "whether the
[Federal Aviation Act] prohibits all transfers of title to aircraft from having validity
against innocent third parties unless the transfer has been evidenced by a written in-
strument, and the instrument has been recorded with the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA)." Philko Aviation, 103 S. Ct. at 2477.
1984]
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craft.27 The Court stated that it was "inclined to agree" with
the Fifth Circuit in Gary Aircraft and added in passing that
"state law determines priorities. '28 The Supreme Court's ac-
tions are a clear signal that the Court does not view the pre-
emption of state law under the Federal Aviation Act to
include priorities of interests in aircraft once such interests
have been properly perfected by a filing in the FAA Aircraft
Registry.
Prior to Philko Aviation, a federal court in Montana had
held that the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt the
U.C.C. priority provision which allows a prior-recorded se-
curity interest priority over subsequent claims in Western State
Bank v. Grumman Credit Corp.29 The Western State court ex-
pressed its view that the Federal Aviation Act expressly pro-
vides that validity of liens is governed by state U.C.C.
provisions.3 The court rejected the argument of a junior
lienholder that the senior lienholder's substitution of a new
debtor, without refiling in the FAA Aircraft Registry, made
the junior lien superior to that of the senior lienholder.3 ' Be-
cause the substitution of debtors was not misleading and the
junior lienholder had notice that the aircraft was encum-
bered, the Western State court held that refiling was not
required.2
Following Philko Aviation, the Massachusetts Court of Ap-
peals, in South Shore Bank v. H & H Aircraft Sales, Inc. ,33 com-
mented on the meaning to be ascribed "actual notice" (of a
prior conveyance), which under the Federal Aviation Act
would preclude an enforceable security interest. 4 In South
21 General Dynamics Corp. v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983), denyt4g
cert. to 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982).
Philko Aviation, 103 S. Ct. at 2480.
564 F. Supp. 9 (D. Mont. 1982), affdmem., 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983).
564 F. Supp. at 13. The Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976), provides:
"The validity of any instrument the recording of which is provided for by section 503
of this Act [49 U.S.C. § 1403] shall be governed by the laws of the State. . . in which
such instrument is delivered.
:,, 564 F. Supp. at 14-16.
'~Id
16 Mass. App. 472, 452 N.E.2d 276 (1983).
:14 Id at 277-81.
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Shore, the claim was first made on appeal that the second in-
terest holder had "actual notice" of the prior purchase.3 5 The
South Shore court held that the issue of "actual notice" may
not be raised for the first time on appeal. The court pro-
ceeded, however, to discuss its interpretation of "actual no-
tice" under the Federal Aviation Act.36 According to the
South Shore court, a broad interpretation of "actual notice,"
imposing on a lender the duty to check for possession of the
aircraft and undertake an extensive investigation into the
ownership of the aircraft, would undermine the reliability of
the FAA recording system and nullify Philko Aviation's re-
quirement that even purchasers in possession of aircraft must
properly file their interests in the FAA Aircraft Registry. 7
Furthermore, as to lenders, the South Shore court stated its
view that a check of the federal records is evidence of suffi-
cient diligence in making a loan. The South Shore court added
that although a lender bank might undertake an investiga-
tion and discover that an aircraft is not in the possession of
the party securing financing, knowledge of nonpossession is
not sufficient to constitute evidence of "actual notice" on the
part of the lender.3 ' The clear impact of the Philko Aviation
and South Shore decisions is that subsequent purchasers or
financers of aircraft will be able to rely upon the records of
the FAA Aircraft Registry to ascertain any prior interests in
aircraft.
In 1983, the Supreme Court also addressed the issues of
federal preemption in the area of state taxation of commer-
cial air carriers. In Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation of Hla-
wa'4 39 the Supreme Court recognized that Section 7(a) of the
Airport Development Acceleration Act of 19734" preempts di-
Id at 279.
'. Id. at 280.
37 Id
:m Id (citing Marsden v. Southern Flight Serv., 227 F. Supp. 411, 416-17 (M.D.N.C.
1961)) ("possession alone . . . [i]s not sufficient to give third parties notice of the pos-
sessor's interest . . . .To hold otherwise would be to import constructive notice into
the statute by the back door.").
, 104 S. Ct. 291 (1983).
- Pub. L. 93-44, § 7(a), 87 Stat. 88, 90, codi.id at 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976). The
court noted that the statute had been amended by the Airport and Airway Improve-
19841 713
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rect or indirect state taxation on persons traveling in air com-
merce, on the sale of air transportation, or on gross receipts
derived therefrom.4  Accordingly, the Court held that a Ha-
waii tax equal to four percent of airlines' gross income was
preempted, even though the tax was denominated a personal
property tax on the property and value of an airline, because
it indirectly taxed gross receipts from air transportation. 42
In another case involving a challenge to state taxation of
air commerce, Delta Airlhnes v. State of Florida,43 a Florida trial
court upheld the constitutionality of a Florida sales tax on
fuel. The sales tax was challenged on the basis of the equal
protection and commerce clauses of the United States Consti-
tution.44 Delta Airlines contended that the state sales tax on
fuel invidiously discriminated against airlines vis-a-vis other
common carriers, and also discriminated against out-of-state
carriers because a tax credit was provided for airlines having
a home office in Florida. 45 Furthermore, Delta contended
that the sales tax was actually a "use" tax which attempted to
regulate interstate commerce.46
Addressing the equal protection challenge, the Delta Air-
lines court held that the distinction for purposes of fuel taxes
between airlines and the common carriers was not unconsti-
tutional. The court reasoned that under Florida law airlines
enjoy some tax advantages over other carriers and therefore
must tolerate some disadvantages as long as the disadvan-
tages are not "hostile and oppressive. '"" The court also held
ment Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, § 532, 96 Stat. 324, 701, codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1513(d) (1982). Since, however, the amendment was enacted after the relevant time
periods, the court based its decision on the earlier law. 104 S. Ct. at 293 n.3.
4, Id at 293.
4 Id at 295. The Court's opinion in Aloha Airles was unanimous. See Aloha Ai'rlhes,
104 S. Ct. at 292, 295. See also Air Transportation Association of America v. New York
State Department of Taxation and Finance, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,092 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983).
4:1 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,443 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1983).
44 The plaintiff had also originally claimed that the sales tax enactment violated
provisions of the Florida State Constitution. This argument however, was abandoned.
Id at 18,444.
45 Id at 18,444-46.
4,; Id at 18,447.
41 Id at 18,446.
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that the tax credit did not impose an unreasonable burden on
foreign corporations. The court stated that the states could
legitimately encourage in-state corporations. The court con-
cluded, therefore, that the state could reasonably benefit
Florida airlines as a class in order to further this objective. 48
Turning to the challenge under the commerce clause, the
court also held that the tax and its concomitant credit to in-
state corporations did not burden interstate commerce. In
reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the fact that the
proceeds from the tax were to "provide funds for transporta-
tion purposes" including airports and aircraft services in the
state of Florida.49 The court stated that the use of public air-
port facilities is a privilege and that the airlines should ac-
cordingly share the costs of the facilities. The court added
that the benefit to the tax paying entity "does not have to be
measured with mathematical accuracy.' ' 0
A third area of federal preemption addressed by the courts
during the survey period was state jurisdiction over the occu-
pational safety and health of airline employees. In United Air-
lhnes v. OSHA Board (Californa), 1 the California Supreme
Court held that the FAA is not vested with authority over the
occupational safety and health of an air carrier's employees
at a ground maintenance facility. In other words, the court
concluded that FAA authority does not divest the California
Division of Occupational Safety and Health of its jurisdiction
over the facility. In California, the state OSHA statute spe-
cifically exempts from the state agency's jurisdiction those
places of employment where state or federal agencies actively
exercise their authority over the safety and health of the em-
ployees.-2 Notwithstanding the exemption in the California
OSHA statute, the United Airhnes court held that the FAA,
although empowered to regulate flight safety, is not statuto-
rily directed to protect the health and safety of airline em-
4" Id. at 18,446-47.
Id at 18,447.
'"Id
32 Cal. 3d 762, 654 P.2d 157, 187 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1982).
, CAL. LAB. CODE § 6303(a) (West 1983).
1984]
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ployees.53 Therefore, the court left the regulation of the
safety and health of airline maintenance workers to state
regulation.54
III. JURISDICTION
A. Federal Subject Matler Jursdiction
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the field of
federal subject matter jurisdiction in In re Mexico City Aircrash
of October 31, 1979,15 involving the crash of a Western Airlines
DC-10. The Mexico City court held that the claims arising
from the death of a Western Airlines' employee who was off-
duty and returning to her home base when the plane crashed
constituted an independent cause of action for wrongful
death under the Warsaw Convention.56 Even though the em-
ployee was a resident of California and even though there
was no diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and de-
fendant, the Ninth Circuit held that the independent cause of
action under the Warsaw Convention provided a basis for
federal jurisdiction of Warsaw Convention claims.57 Mexico
City is significant not only because it recognizes that federal
question jurisdiction exists for claims to which the Warsaw
Convention applies, but also because it recognizes an implied
cause of action for wrongful death under the treaties rather
than under the provisions of state law.58
In a case involving an airline passenger's claim for delay
':, 654 P.2d at 160.
. Id at 165.
708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id at 415.
, The Ninth Circuit also held that the implied cause of action arising under the
Warsaw Convention, injfa note 137, preempts the California Workers Compensation
bar for recovery and that under the Warsaw Convention, the claims arising from the
death of an off-duty employee are not barred by the employer-employee relationship.
The Ninth Circuit denied Warsaw Convention claims arising from the deaths of on-
duty employees killed in the crash on the grounds that they were not "passengers"
subject to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention. Id at 416-18.
. - The Second Circuit view is set forth in Benjamins v. British European Airways,
572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979). See generally C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3563, at 424-25
(1975).
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arising out of an unscheduled and emergency landing due to
an explosion of the aircraft tires on takeoff, the federal court
in Arken v. Trans International Airlines59 held that section 404 of
the Federal Aviation Act6' does not apply to a tire manufac-
turer, create an implied cause of action against a tour opera-
tor, or provide a basis for applying pendent jurisdiction over
non-federal claims against such parties. In this regard, the
court held that section 404 of the Federal Aviation Act ap-
plies on its face only to air carriers and only requires proof of
a confirmed reservation, compliance with the conditions of
transportation, entitlement to a seat on the aircraft, and the
refusal to honor the reservation. 6' The court further ex-
plained that a section 404 claim was substantially different
from the state law claims for negligence and breach of war-
ranty against the tire manufacturer or claims for breach of
contract and misrepresentation against the tour operator, and
that state law claims therefore were not proper subjects for
the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.62
In contrast, in Letnes v. United States,63 the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona held that federal
jurisdiction over claims against the United States arising
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provided a basis
for ancillary party jurisdiction over negligence claims under
state law.64 The plaintiffs alleged that the United States was
liable under the FTCA for negligence in the supervision and
control of aircraft fighting forest fires.65 Plaintiffs also alleged
that several private parties were liable under state law for
negligence in their operation of aircraft.66 In reaching its
568 F. Supp. 11 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
49 U.S.C.A. § 1374 (West 1976 & Supp. 1984).
568 F. Supp. at 16 (citing Nadar v. Allegheny Airlines, 445 F. Supp. 168, 172
(D.D.C. 1978), rev'd, 626 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
;2 568 F. Supp. at 16. The court quoted from Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1
(1976): "If the new party sought to be joined is not otherwise subject to federal juris-
diction, there is a more serious obstacle to the exercise of pendent jurisdiction than if
parties already before the court are required to litigate a state law claim." 427 U.S. at
18.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,327 (D. Ariz. 1982).
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conclusion, the court pointed out that not only did the other
defendants meet the criteria for compulsive joinder, but that
judicial resources would be conserved by retaining jurisdic-
tion and that both claims arose out of a common nucleus of
operative facts.67
B. PersonalJurisdiction
One of the cases currently pending in the United States
Supreme Court is Heicopteros Nactonales De Columbi'a, SA. v.
Hall.6" This case is on appeal from the Supreme Court of
Texas, which held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident Colombian corporation in a wrongful
death action arising out of a helicopter accident in Peru did
not violate due process.6 9 In Heicopteros, the Supreme Court
is faced with two major issues. First, the Court must decide
whether the Texas courts may constitutionally assert in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a non-resident Columbian corpora-
tion in a wrongful death action arising from an accident in
Peru, where the Columbian corporation's sole contacts with
Texas involved equipment purchases from a third-party
Texas corporation and a single contract discussion with the
decedents' employer in Texas and where the plaintiffs' causes
of action did not arise out of these contacts. 7' The second
issue is whether the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment are violated by exercise of in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident alien corporation
under circumstances in which a resident United States corpo-
ration could not constitutionally be subjected to
jurisdiction.7'
-a Id
' 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1270 (1983). The case was
argued in November, 1983. See infra note 71.
638 S.W.2d at 879.
' 52 U.S.L.W. 3078 (U.S. May 16, 1983).
7, Id The Supreme Court held that the nonresident corporation's contacts with
Texas were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process, and that mere
purchases by a nonresident corporation, even where occurring at regular intervals, are
insufficient to warrant the exercise of in personam jurisdiction in a cause of action
arising from such contacts. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S.
Ct. 1868 (1984). [Eds.].
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As suggested by the questions to be determined by the
Supreme Court, the application of in personam jurisdiction
in aircraft accident cases is by no means a straightforward
proposition. Furthermore, in recent years the application of
various state long arm statutes has increasingly become an
exercise in investigating and evaluating the unrelated con-
tacts of non-resident corporate defendants in cases in which
the cause of action did not arise within the forum state in
order to determine whether such unrelated contacts provide a
basis for the constitutional exercise of in personam jurisdic-
tion by the courts of the forum state. Not infrequently, such
decisions are based upon a subjective determination by the
trial court as to whether, in view of the unrelated contacts of
the non-resident corporate defendant, the exercise of in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the defendant would offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice. '"72 The
result of such subjective evaluations determines whether the
exercise of long arm jurisdiction is constitutionally permissi-
ble. Finally, these "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice," like "obscenity, '' 3 tend to defy definition,
and the best that can be said is that on a case by case basis
perhaps the courts will instinctively recognize a case in which
such "traditional notions" have been offended. Hopefully,
Hlehcopteros will provide guidance as to the proper analysis of
difficult cases involving questionable in personam jurisdiction
and reveal whether contacts with a forum state, which are
unrelated to the cause of action, may provide a basis for in
personam jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.
Following the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Hall v.
Hehcopteros, a federal district court in Cobb v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp.,74 held that the manufacturer of an escape system for
a military aircraft was subject to personal jurisdiction in
'1 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940)).
1:, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligently doing so. But I know it when I see it.
7 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,184 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
1984]
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Texas for wrongful death arising from an accident in Florida.
In Cobb, the court found that the component manufacturer's
conduct in connection with Texas was such that it could rea-
sonably have anticipated being haled into court in Texas. In
reaching its decision, the court noted that the manufacturer
had a technical representative in Texas, that it manufactured
escape systems for aircraft based in Texas, and that it sold
other escape systems to Texas aircraft manufacturers.75
In another case involving issues of in personam jurisdic-
tion, the Illinois Court of Appeals held in Maunder v. DeHavil-
land Aircraf of Canada, Ltd,76 that a Canadian aircraft
manufacturer was subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois
for injuries arising out of an aircraft accident in Africa. The
Maunder court evaluated the Illinois contacts of the Canadian
aircraft manufacturer and concluded that the manufacturer
"actively and systematically did business in the state through
its wholly owned subsidiaries which sold and distributed
parts for the manufacturer's aircraft. ' 77 The court specifi-
cally held in Maunder that the exercise of jurisdiction based
on contacts unrelated to the aircraft accident in Africa did
not offend its understanding of the "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. ' 78
In State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale,79 the Ore-
gon Supreme Court held that a component manufacturer
which sold parts to be incorporated into aircraft to be distrib-
uted throughout the country could reasonably expect to be
haled into court in every state, because it "delivered its prod-
ucts into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in [every state]." 8 ° The
'1 Id at 18,185-86.
- 112 Il1. App. 3d 879, 445 N.E.2d 1303 (1983).
" 445 N.E.2d at 1306. In Maunder, the court placed great reliance on the "control"
exercised over the subsidiary by the parent, including the complete stock ownership by
the parent and the combined financial statement of the parent and the subsidiary.
The court concluded that the Illinois subsidiary was merely an "alter ego" of its corpo-
rate parent. Id
1 Id at 1307.
79 294 Or. 381, 657 P.2d 211 (1982).
.1 657 P.2d at 215 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
298 (1980)).
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Oregon court based its decision upon the Gray v. American Ra-
dialor8l line of authority, indicating that Gray was not limited
by the later Supreme Court decision in World- Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson.2 This decision is consistent with
other products liability cases limiting World- Wide Volkswagen,
which have held that non-resident corporate defendants fur-
ther up the chain of distribution of products introduced into
the nationwide "stream of commerce" may be subject to ju-
risdiction, while distributors further down the chain of distri-
bution which limit their distribution activities to specific
states and territories generally are not subject to jurisdiction
throughout the United States under a "stream of commerce"
theory. 3
A case which demonstrates the disparate treatment of non-
resident corporate defendants depending upon their products
and services provided to aircraft is Roberts v. Piper Aircraft
Corp.84 Roberts involved an aircraft accident in New Mexico.
The plaintiff brought suit in a New Mexico court against a
non-resident Oklahoma engine repair facility, a non-resident
hydraulic pump maintenance facility, and a non-resident
supplier of fuel for the aircraft. Even though all three of the
non-resident corporate defendants could have expected that
the aircraft they repaired or serviced might have an accident
in any state, the Roberts court considered whether each de-
fendant had contacts with New Mexico, derived revenue
from New Mexico, availed itself of the protection of New
Mexico laws, or did repair work for New Mexico residents, in
order to determine whether any of the defendants might rea-
sonably have expected to be haled into court in New Mex-
ico. 5 With regard to the Oklahoma engine repair facility,
the court observed that it derived substantial revenue from
New Mexico, availed itself of the protection of New Mexico
ol 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
11 657 P.2d at 215. See Note, 46 J. AIR L. & COM. 541 (1981) (World-Wide
Volkswagen).
.... See, e.g., Nelson v. Park Indus., 717 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1983), and cases
cited therein.
- 100 N.M. 363, 670 P.2d 974 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
ar, 670 P.2d at 977-79.
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laws and did repair work for New Mexico residents. The
court therefore held that it was not unreasonable or unfair for
it to defend litigation in New Mexico arising from a New
Mexico accident.86 As to the non-resident fuel supplier, the
court found that it did not have any contacts, ties, or rela-
tions with New Mexico and the fact that fuel sold by the sup-
plier found its way into New Mexico did not support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. 7 Finally, with regard to the
maintenance facility that performed repair work on the hy-
draulic pumps, the court held that the plaintiffs had not car-
ried their burden of proof to present evidence sufficiently
connecting the non-resident corporate defendant to New
Mexico to sustain the exercise of personal jurisdiction.88
Hydraulic Servocontrols and Roberts contrast the treatment ac-
corded component manufacturers and servicers of aircraft
and suppliers of aircraft products. Hydrau/' SerHocontrols
shows that courts are likely to find that a component manu-
facturer which sells components to be incorporated into air-
craft to be sold and used throughout the United States can
reasonably expect to be subjected to jurisdiction for claims
arising from accidents within all states. On the other hand,
Roberts indicated that repair facilities and suppliers of avia-
tion products which limit their services and sales of products
to specific geographic areas will probably not be subject to
jurisdiction under a "stream of commerce" theory for acci-
dents in foreign states. If, however, such repair facilities or
suppliers specifically attempt to do business with persons in
the forum state, derive revenue from the forum state and
avail themselves of protection of the laws of the forum state,
they may be subject to in personam jurisdiction. Even under
these circumstances, however, the exercise of personal juris-
diction over the repair facilities or suppliers would be proper
- Id. at 978-79. The Oklahoma repair facility had also advertised in two national
aviation journals. Id at 978.
,7 Id The supplier was a Las Vegas, Nevada fixed base operator which did not
"solicit" business from New Mexico. Id.
SId at 979.
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only if it does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.
In another case, Schneider v. Sverdsten Logging Co.,89 the Idaho
Supreme Court held that both the former Pennsylvania cor-
porate owner-operator of an aircraft and the maintenance fa-
cility which had maintained an aircraft in Pennsylvania had
insufficient contacts with Idaho to support long-arm jurisdic-
tion in Idaho for an accident occurring after the sale of the
aircraft to an Idaho resident. The Schneider court stated that,
although the maintenance facility advertised nationally,
there was no specific showing that it had attempted to service
the Idaho market by means of such advertising. The court
therefore declined to exercise personal juridiction over the
non-resident corporate defendants. 90
A comparison of the activities of the engine repair facilities
in Roberts and Schneider demonstrates that the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction is largely a question of degree because
both facilities had advertised to a national market. A show-
ing was made in Roberts, however, that the facility actually
served the New Mexico market through its advertising, while
no showing of service to the Idaho market was made in
Schneider. The mere presence of national advertising appar-
ently does not alone justify the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion in every state. Although these opinions do not state a
rule that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction based solely
on national advertising apparently would necessarily offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the
courts seem to be in agreement that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion in such circumstances would be unconstitutional.
C. Forum Non Conveniens
Since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,9 ' the federal courts have had numer-
ous occasions to consider the application of forum non con-
104 Idaho 210, 657 P.2d 1078 (1983).
657 P.2d at 1080-83.
454 U.S. 235 (1981). The Reyno case held that plaintiffs in an aviation case could
not defeat a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens merely by showing that
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veniens as grounds for the dismissal of actions. The First,
Second and Ninth Circuits have affirmed forum non con-
veniens dismissals during the past year.92 In contrast, the
Seventh Circuit, while recognizing the proper application of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, has held that a district
court failed to consider several important factors with regard
to a dismissal and remanded the case to the district court for
further consideration. 93
In Ahmed v. Boeing Co., 9 4 the First Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's forum non conveniens dismissal in a suit brought
by the representatives of twenty-two Pakistani citizens who
were killed in an accident involving a Pakistani airliner en
route from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan. The Massachusetts dis-
trict court accepted a carefully detailed recommendation
from the magistrate to dismiss the suit for forum non con-
veniens reasons if the defendant, Boeing, would agree to ap-
pear as a defendant in either Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, to
forego any statute of limitations defense other than those
available if the case remained in Massachusetts, to make
available any witness's evidence and to pay any judgment
rendered against it. 95 The First Circuit stated that Ahmedwas
"on all fours" with Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,9 6 because the
comparative availability of witnesses and evidence, the place
of the accident, the nationality of the victims, and the com-
parative judicial familiarity with the likely applicable law all
strongly favored a trial abroad. 97
The plaintiffs in Ahmed argued that the trial court failed to
consider that Pakistanian International Airlines had already
paid approximately $30,000 respectively to eighteen of the
twenty-two plaintiffs. This payment, known as the "diah", or
"blood money," was given in settlement of the survivors'
the substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum (Scotland) was less
favorable to the plaintiff than the chosen forum. Id at 247.
- See infra text accompanying notes 94-106.
q: See infta text accompanying notes 111-114.
720 F.2d 224 (1st Cir. 1983).
' Id. at 225.
See supra note 91.
" Ahmed, 720 F.2d at 226.
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claims. The plaintiffs argued that such settlements indicated
that the case presented the "rare circumstances" in which the
remedy offered by another forum is clearly unsatisfactory. 98
The First Circuit concluded that a Massachusetts court
would probably have to apply foreign law with regard to
"diah" payments and, in any event, a possible limitation on
damages to such "diah" payments resulted in at most a
change in the substantive law which the Supreme Court held
to not be determinative in Piper Aircraft. The court added
that the "rare exception" referred to in Pzter Aircraft is limited
to cases in which the application of a foreign substantive law
would be both different and basically unjust.9 9 The court
held that the district court had not abused its discretion in
finding that the 100,000 Ryal "diah" did not present such a
rare exception with regard to the foreign plaintiffs.100
In Overseas National Atrways v. Cargolux Airlines Int'l,'0 1 the
Second Circuit held that the balance of factors weighed heav-
ily in favor of a foreign forum in a case involving the destruc-
tion of the hull of an aircraft while the aircraft was
undergoing modification at a hanger in a foreign country.
The court pointed out that at least two foreign citizens were
essential witnesses, the principal documents were located in
the foreign country and were in a foreign language, and for-
eign contract law applied to the property damage claim. Ac-
cordingly, the court considered dismissal on the basis of
forum non conveniens appropriate."°2
In Cheng v. Boeing Co.,' °3 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a forum
non conveniens dismissal of the claims of foreign nationals
" Id
~"Id
"" Id at 225-26.
712 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 14. Justice Oakes, who dissented in Fitzgerald v. Texaco, 521 F.2d 448, 456
(2d Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976), concurred in the opinion of the court
but noted that he was not retreating from the view that the entire forum non con-
veniens doctrine should be reexamined in light of the "transportation revolution that
has occurred in the last thirty-six years." 712 F.2d at 14.
-: 708 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Nai-Chao v. Boeing Co., 52
U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. 1983).
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arising out of an aircraft accident in Taiwan." 4 The Ninth
Circuit approved of the district court's finding that Taiwan
was a proper alternative forum.'0 5 The Ninth Circuit also
approved the district court's conclusion that both private and
public interest factors favored a foreign forum for the claims
of foreign nationals against a foreign air carrier, an American
air carrier, and an American aircraft manufacturer where the
accident occurred in a foreign country operated by the for-
eign carrier. 0
6
In Apohnar'o v. Avco Corp.,' °7 a federal district court in Con-
necticut held that the claims of two Canadian citizens for
damages sustained as a result of the crash of a helicopter in
Ontario during a flight from Edmonton to Montreal should
be dismissed based on forum non conveniens. The Apoh/ario
court found the fact that Canada provided an available alter-
native forum, that the plaintiffs were Canadian, that the
owner and operator of the aircraft was a foreign national,
and that the airframe manufacturer was a foreign national,
all strongly favored a foreign forum for the claims against the
Connecticut-based manufacturer of the helicopter engine.10 8
In Wah/in v. Edo Corp.,' 09 a New York trial court found that
the wrongful death actions brought in New York by repre-
sentatives of foreign nationals killed in a Swedish aircraft ac-
cident against the manufacturer of the aircraft and its
components had no nexus with New York. The court held
that Sweden was a proper alternative forum and was the
most appropriate forum because of the availability of wit-
nesses and evidence relating to the accident and the mainte-
nance of the aircraft, and because the owners, operators, and
the maintenance facilities were subject to personal jurisdic-
tion in the Swedish courts. Instead of dismissing the action,
however, the New York court stayed the action pending ac-
' Id at 1409-11.
I d.
561 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1982).
" Id at 609-11.
17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,562 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
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ceptance of jurisdiction by the appropriate Swedish court. "1
The Seventh Circuit reversed a forum non conveniens dis-
missal in Macedo v. Boeing Co."' Macedo arose from an acci-
dent in Portugal. The Seventh Circuit held that while the
plaintiffs had no connection with Illinois and under the Illi-
nois choice of law rules Portugese law would apply to many
of the issues, the district court had failed to consider the need
for discovery under the federal rules with respect to the air-
craft manufacturer and the financial burden that would be
imposed on American plaintiffs bringing the action in Portu-
gal." '2 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case
to the district court for a consideration of these private inter-
est factors, including consideration of a co-pending motion to
transfer the actions from the Northern District of Illinois to
the Western District of Washington." 3
The District of Columbia Circuit also held that a forum
non conveniens dismissal was not proper. The court in
Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp."' reversed
such a dismissal because private interest factors showed that
scientific evidence, documentary evidence, and the familiar-
ity of the court and counsel with the accident favored the
United States as a proper forum. In Friends the claims were
brought by foreign nationals injured in an accident involving
a Lockheed C-5 aircraft during the evacuation of Viet
Nam." 5 The court stated that where private interest factors
are not in equipoise, then public interest factors need not be
consulted. "6
Similarly, in Ruchi v. Boeing Co.," 7 a Pennsylvania federal
court held, in the context of an aircraft accident in West Ger-
many, that a forum non conveniens dismissal of the claims of
.... Id. at 17,564.
". 693 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1983).
" Id at 691.
Id
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,118 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 17,122-23.
Id. at 17,123. For an excellent treatment of the forum non conveniens doctrine,
see Nails v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 702 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (denial of motion for
rehearing en bane) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
'" 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,153 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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foreign nationals would not be proper where claims of Ameri-
can nationals would be litigated in the United States. The
court stated that a dismissal would result in separating the
cases and litigation between the United States and West Ger-
many. The court concluded that such a separation of the
cases would not advance the interests of ease of litigation or
reduction of expenses." 8
Finally, in In re Aircraft Disaster Near Bombay, India on January
1, 1978,"' a Washington federal district court held that be-
cause the statute of limitations for filing suits in India had
expired, the defendants failed to meet their burden of show-
ing that there was an alternative forum. In addition, the
Bombay court held that the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA) 20 applied to death claims of foreign nationals
against an American aircraft manufacturer. The court rea-
soned that the "high seas" are not necessarily limited to inter-
national waters and consequently applied DOHSA although
the crash occurred within Indian territorial waters. The Bom-
bay court also held that Indian law would apply to the
claims. 121
In general, these forum non conveniens cases substantially
limit the accessibility of American courts to foreign nationals
asserting claims against both foreign and American defend-
ants arising out of aircraft accidents in foreign countries. It
also appears, however, that in order for a forum non con-
veniens dismissal to be proper, an appropriate alternative fo-
rum must exist. Under certain circumstances that
requirement is not met if a foreign statute of limitations has
expired, if the plaintiffs will be unable to obtain discovery
from American defendants, or if necessary information is
available only in the United States. Finally, forum non con-
veniens dismissals of the claims of American nationals arising
out of foreign aircraft accidents generally have not been fa-
vored in the absence of a clear showing that other private
"" Id at 17,154.
". 531 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
- 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1976).
,2, 531 F. Supp. at 1188-91.
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interest factors favor the alternative forum. Of course, as in
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, obstacles to forum non conveniens
dismissals, such as the inability to secure discovery against
American defendants or the expiration of foreign statutes of
limitations, may be avoided where defendants consent to co-
operate in providing such discovery or waive the applicable
foreign statutes of limitations.
D. Death on the High Seas Act and Suits in Admiralty Act
In Williams v. United States,'22 the Ninth Circuit held that
death claims against the United States for negligently failing
to undertake timely measures to locate and report the loss of
a transoceanic flight between California and Hawaii arose
under admiralty law because the wrong occurred over navi-
gable waters and the flight bore a significant relation to tradi-
tional maritime activity performed by water-borne vessels.
The court further held that admiralty claims against the
United States are not proper under the Federal Tort Claims
Act 123 because that Act is not applicable to admiralty claims.
The court added that the exclusive basis for jurisdiction over
admiralty claims against the United States is the Suits in Ad-
miralty Act. 2 4  Moreover, since the plaintiffs had sued the
FAA, not the United States as required by the Suits in Admi-
ralty Act,' 25 and since the United States was not served
within the two year statute of limitations applicable to the
Suits in Admiralty Act,126 the court barred the claims despite
the fact that administrative claims against the FAA had been
filed within the two year statute of limitations'period. 127 The
12 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,533 (9th Cir. 1983).
-. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1976).
'24 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1976).
46 U.S.C. § 781 (1976) states that:
A libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United
States, or a petition impleading the United States, for damages caused
by a public vessel of the United States, and for compensation for towage
and salvage services, including contract salvage, rendered to a public
vessel of the United States . . ..
' 46 U.S.C. § 782 (1976) links the requirements of the Suits in Admiralty Act to
the rules promulgated in 28 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1976).
121 17 Av. Gas. (CCH) at 18,535-36.
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court further refused to allow the plaintiffs to add the United
States as a defendant, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(c), because notice to the FAA would not be imputed to the
United States Attorney or Attorney General. 128
In Alexander v. United Technologies Corp.,' 29 a Connecticut
federal district court addressed whether the Death on the
High Seas Act (DOHSA) 13 ° confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the federal courts and therefore entitles a defendant to
remove a case involving a death on the high seas from state
court to federal court under federal question removal juris-
diction. In Alexander, the representatives of an individual
killed in a helicopter accident off the coast of Brazil brought
suit in Connecticut state court for wrongful death under Con-
necticut law. 13' The court held that DOHSA was intended
to establish a concurrent rather than exlusive remedy for
claims arising from deaths on the high seas. The Alexander
court added that exclusive admiralty jurisdiction was not
compelled because the claims against the defendant helicop-
ter manufacturer did not arise from traditional maritime ac-
tivity, but rather arose from the design, manufacture, sale
and distribution of the helicopter involved in the accident. 132
In Miller v. Eaton Corp.,'33 a federal district court in Georgia
held that the amended statute of limitations under DOHSA
(extending the limitation period from two to three years) 134
applied retroactively to a claim arising prior to the amend-
ment. The amendment was enacted prior to the expiration of
the former two year period of limitation on the plaintiff's
28Id
548 F. Supp. 139 (D. Conn. 1982).
46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67.
548 F. Supp. at 140.
Id at 143. The plaintiff in Alexander based his claim entirely on state law and
chose not to seek the remedy provided by the Death on the High Seas Act. The court
noted that "[t]he plaintiff is the master of his claim and is entitled to choose the law he
will rely upon." Id.
,:,:. 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,337 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
.... 46 U.S.C. § 763(a) (1982) extended the statute of limitations period from two
years to three years. At least two courts have held that the amendment could not be
applied retroactively. See Gribshaw v. Ohio Barge Lines, 532 F. Supp. 866 (W.D. Pa.
1982); Ponce v. Graceous Navigation, 126 Cal. App. 3d 823, 179 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1981).
Both of these cases dealt with maritime rather than aviation accidents.
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claims. The court interpreted the amendment as being reme-
dial because the prior two year limitation period did not ex-
tinguish rights under DOHSA but merely barred actions. In
effect, the Miller court applied the general rule recognizing
the "validity of statutes enlarging the period of limitation as
to existing causes of action, that is, causes of action not
barred by the original limitation."'' 35
E. Federal Removal
In two cases during the survey period, a federal district
court in New York reaffirmed the right of a defendant to
remove a case arising under the Warsaw Convention 136 to
federal court on the basis of federal treaty jurisdiction. In
Reiser v. Meloi World Travel Service,137 the court indicated that
removal of a claim governed by the Warsaw Convention was
proper, with the court apparently having had ancillary juris-
diction over other non-Warsaw claims arising from the same
occurrence. 38 In Feuer v. Pan American World rwai ,  , 13 9 the
same court found that cases arising under the Warsaw Con-
vention may be removed to federal court even though the
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction and the plaintiff or-
dinarily has the right to select a forum. 4 °
In another removal case, the same New York federal court
in Lopez v. American Airlines14' found that removal based upon
diversity jurisdiction was proper even though the defendant
American Airlines was doing business in New York.'42 The
Lopez court applied the "nerve center" test for determining
the principal place of business for an airline with far-flung
activities, concluding that Texas was the "center of all signifi-
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,338.
The Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Car-
riage by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137
L.N.T.S. 11 (1929) [hereafter cited as Convention].
.... 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,208 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
,:1. See id at 17,208-11.
17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,325 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
14o Id.
"4 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,892 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
-1 Id. at 17,892.
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cant corporate policy-making activity." '143 Accordingly, the
court allowed American Airlines to remove the case from a
state court in New York to the federal district court for the
Southern District of New York."'
IV. CONFLICT OF LAWS
'The cases decided during the survey period showed a con-
tinued trend toward the adoption of "governmental interest
analysis" and the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts1 45 "sub-
stantial relationship test" in determining the law to be ap-
plied to issues arising from aircraft accident litigation.
In In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D. C- on Januay 13,
1982,146 the federal district court for the District of Columbia
held that for cases filed in other districts based on diversity
jurisdiction and transferred to the District of Columbia, it
must follow the conflict of laws rules of the states in which the
actions were originally filed. The court then applied the vari-
ous state conflicts rules to the issues relating to the defend-
ants' liability for compensatory damages, apportionment of
liability among defendants, and defendants' liability for pu-
nitive damages. 47 The court held that as to all cases filed in
jurisdictions following the "governmental interest analysis,"
the law of the District of Columbia would be applied to gov-
ern the question of the liability of the aircraft manufacturer
for punitive damages, rather than the law of the State of
Washington in which the aircraft was manufactured. 48
The court distinguished the case before it from the cases
arising from the American Airlines DC-10 accident in Chi-
cago. "'4 9 The court stated that the District of Columbia's in-
:1 Id.
144 Id
- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 145, 146, 175 (1971).
I'll 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983) (The litigation arose out of the Air Florida disas-
ter in January, 1982).
,47 See id at 335. The court's earlier memorandum opinion and order had deter-
mined that the laws of the State of Washington, where the aircraft was manufactured,
would govern the assessment of punitive damages against the Boeing Company. Id.
.Id at 352-59.
, See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illionis on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594
(7th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Lin v. American Airlines, 454 U.S. 878 (1981). The Dis-
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terest in liability for punitive damages vis-a-vis Washington
(the state of manufacture) was greater than Illinois' interest
vis-a-vis the other two interested states (California and Mis-
souri) in the Chicago crash.15 0 The court also noted that the
Boeing 737 aircraft had been designed for operation from air-
ports such as Washington National Airport, and that the Dis-
trict of Columbia had a substantial interest in accidents
involving aircraft designed to operate from its territory. 151
The court added that the State of Washington had an inter-
est in the design of the aircraft, but that such interest was not
greater than the interest of the District of Columbia in the
case. 152
In Proprietors Insurance Co. v. Valsecchz,1 53 a Florida appellate
court applied the significant relationship analysis to claims
arising from the deaths of Florida residents in an accident in
North Carolina. The accident involved an aircraft rented in
Florida, owned by Florida residents, and on a trip which was
intended to begin in Florida and end in Florida. The Val-
secchi court rejected the application of the law of the place of
the accident on the issue of wrongful death damages under
the significant relationships test because the crash in North
Carolina was purely fortuitous and the plaintiffs' decedents
had no other contacts, such as employment or temporary resi-
dence, with North Carolina. 154  The court also rejected the
trict of Columbia court noted that the basis of the Circuit's decision in Chzcago was the
inability of the court under the interest analysis to determine which of two competing
states' interests were greater or to arrive at a "moderate and restrained" interpretation
of the relevant policies. Consequently, the court chose the law of the site of the injury
to "break the tie." 557 F. Supp. at 336.
-, Id. at 337.
,r,, Id. at 358. The court stated:
Boeing has a much more substantial relationship to the District of Co-
lumbia than a manufacturer generally has to the site of injury in a typi-
cal "fortuitous crash" case. It reasonably could have foreseen and no
doubt desired, that its short-haul 737 aircraft would be used for flights
out of Washington National Airport, one of the nation's busiest airports




18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
Id. at 17,435-36.
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contention that the lex loci dehctus rule should be applied in a
case in which the law of the place where the accident oc-
curred is more generous than the law of the state to be ap-
plied under the significant relationships test. 55
In Schulhof v. Northeast Cellulose, Inc.,' 56 a Massachusetts fed-
eral court applied a Massachusetts conflicts rule very similar
to the governmental interest analysis. The Schulhofcourt held
that with regard to claims arising from a mid-air collision
over Massachusetts, Massachusetts law would apply to tort
liablity issues and to the issues of compensatory and punitive
damages. On the other hand, as to claims arising from
breach of the contract of carriage which had been formed in
New Hampshire, the court held that New Hampshire law
would apply. 57
Finally, in Sargent Industries v. Delta Airines,158 the Georgia
Supreme Court, in response to a certified question by the
Eleventh Circuit, held that the Georgia lex loci dehctus rule
applied to indemnity claims against the employer of the
claimant, even though the employment relationship was lo-
calized in another state, and even though the employee was
drawing worker's compensation in the other state.'59 The
court noted, however, that the accident and injury occurred
in Georgia and that the plaintiff would have been eligible for
worker's compensation in both states. 160
V. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. Apphcabi'lty
In Lockheed Aircraft Co. v. United Slates,'6' the United States
Supreme Court held that the Federal Employees Compensa-
tion Act (FECA) 62 does not bar a Federal Tort Claims Act
Id. at 17,436-37.
545 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Mass. 1982).
,, Id at 1208-10.
17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,592 (11th Cir. 1983).
Id at 18,594.
""Id
103 S. Ct. 1033 (1983).
5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-51, 8171-73, 8191-93 (1982).
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(FTCA)'6 3 indemnity action by a manufacturer against the
United States arising from the claims of a federal employee
against the manufacturer, even though the federal employee
would have been barred from suit against the United States.
The Supreme Court carefully reviewed the FECA, and could
find no evidence of congressional intent or any other basis for
implying a limitation under the FECA on the indemnity
rights of third parties against the United States.' 64 The
Court distinguished Lockheed from the Feres and Stencel doc-
trines, 16 5 which limit indemnity claims against the United
States arising out of military accidents on the ground that the
waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the FTCA does not
extend to military personnel. The Court resolved, however,
that the waiver of sovereign immunity does extend to claims
arising from accidents involving other government
employees. 166
In Heflee v. United States,'67 the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the
application of the Feres and Stencel doctrines to indemnity
claims of a helicopter manufacturer against the federal gov-
ernment based on an implied contract of indemnity relating
to the maintenance and inspection of aircraft. The He flee
court held that the contract claims were barred by the Feres
and Stencel doctrines since the claims directly related to the
conduct of the military.' 6  Furthermore, according to the
court, military superiors were entitled to immunity from suit
under the Feres and Stencel doctrines. 69 Finally, the Heftee
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
103 S. Ct. 1036-37.
Id at 1037-38 n.8. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S.
666 (1977); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The Court in Feres held that
the United States is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to service-
men suffered in activity incident to service. The Court in Stencel extended the immu-
nity recognized in Feres to third-party indemnity actions against the United States.
Justice Rehnquist and the Chief Justice, dissenting in Lockheed, opined that the major-
ity was "mistaken when it state[d] that Stencel was decided 'without regard to any ex-
clusive liability provision.' " 103 S. Ct. at 1040 n.4.
-; Id. at 1036-37.
167 713 F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1983).
" Id at 1492-93.
mg Id at 1490-92. The court noted that immunity applied regardless of whether the
alleged act of negligence was discretionary or ministerial, and futher rejected the plain-
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court held, in evaluating the sovereign immunity statutes of
Kansas, that the Kansas National Guard and the State of
Kansas were also entitled to sovereign immunity from indem-
nity claims under the state statutes. 170
In Seilfors v. United States"7' the Eleventh Circuit held that
the Airport and Airway Development Act of 197072 does not
create a privately enforceable statutory duty on the part of
the federal government inuring to private citizens using fed-
erally funded airports. Se//fors involved the crash of a private
plane which had ingested birds into its engines during take-
off. The plaintiffs had alleged that air traffic controllers were
negligent in failing to warn the pilot of the proximity of the
birds. 73 The court further held that the FTCA does not al-
low a claim against the federal government where state law
would not permit such action based upon the omission or fail-




One of the most significant issues pending before the
Supreme Court during the survey period is presented in two
cases from the Ninth Circuit. In Varig Airlines v. United
States 75 and United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States,176 the
Ninth Circuit held that the certification and inspection of air-
craft by the FAA does not fall within the discretionary func-
tion exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. On appeal to
tiff's argument that the Feres and Stencel doctrines did not apply when the injured party
was not on "active duty." Id at 1492.
171 Id at 1493-94. The court would not retroactively apply the Tort Claims Act of
the State of Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-6101 to 75-6118 (Supp. 1982), which was
enacted after the accident.
- 697 F.2d 1361 (11th Cir. 1983).
49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-03, 1711-27 (1976).
,7: 697 F.2d at 1364.
' Id. at 1367-68. The court noted that the laws of the State of Georgia did not
recognize a "comparable private liability" under Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126,
249 S.E.2d 573 (1978), and that the plaintiff had not shown the acts necessary to create
a duty under the good samaritan doctrine as set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 323 (1965).
692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1084 (1983).
692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1084 (1983).
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the Supreme Court, the issues presented in the two cases are
whether the United States can be held liable under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act for the FAA's alleged failure to discover
safety defects while carrying out its regulatory duty of certify-
ing airworthiness of commercial aircraft and whether such
FTCA actions are barred by the "discretionary function" or
"misrepresentation" exceptions to the FTCA. 77
A similar question was presented to the Fourth Circuit in
George v. United States.178 In George, the Fourth Circuit held
that the FAA's failure to issue standards banning the use of a
defective method of designing aircraft fuel systems does not
subject the United States to liability under the FTCA. The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the discretionary function ex-
ception bars recovery based on faulty FAA approval of air-
craft design features, or more specifically, bars recovery based
on the FAA's issuance of type, production, and airworthiness
certificates and failure to warn of dangers discovered in the
course of the certification process. 179
Similarly, in Hudson v. United States,80 a Texas federal dis-
trict court held that the Federal Aviation Act does not give
rise to a private cause of action against the United States for
the FAA's negligence in certifying a mechanic and an author-
ized inspector. The court held that the mechanic and inspec-
tor were not employees of the Federal Aviation
Administration and that the FAA did not control the details
of their work. 8" Moreover, the court indicated that the Fed-
eral Aviation Act does not create a private cause of action. 8 2
During the survey period, the District of Columbia Circuit
interpreted the discretionary function exception to the FTCA
in two cases involving the denial of medical certificates by the
,7, 52 U.S.L.W. 3074-75 (U.S. Aug. 16, 1983). The Supreme Court held in these
consolidated cases that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA precludes a
tort action based upon the negligence of the FAA in certifying aircraft for use in com-
mercial aviation. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), 104 S. Ct. 60 (1984) [Eds.].
17a 703 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1983).
,,9 Id at 90-92.
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FAA. In both Harr v. United States'83 and Beins v. United
States,184 the District of Columbia Circuit held that the discre-
tionary function exception of the FTCA does not preclude all
claims against the FAA arising from the negligent failure of
the FAA to administer and evaluate applications for medical
certification under its regulations.'85 Furthermore, in Harr,
the court also held that failure to disclose information to a
pilot applicant in a timely manner constitutes a basis for a
FTCA claim for negligence and that such failure does not fall
within the discretionary function exception of the FTCA.'86
Finally, in Medley v. United States,'8 7 a California federal dis-
trict court held that a decision of the FAA to chart an airway
over a mountainous area was a discretionary function and
therefore within the discretionary function exception of the
FTCA.' 18  The court also held, however, that once the FAA
decided to establish the route over a mountainous area, fail-
ure to warn of dangers associated with the route did not fall
within the discretionary function exception of the FTCA.8 9
C. Other Cases
In Brooks v. United States,'90 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a trial
court decision holding that the FAA negligently failed to pro-
vide a pilot with Notices to Airmen (NOTAMS) relating to
runway construction.' 9 ' The court also upheld a trial court
finding that the pilot had been twenty-five percent negligent
under the Texas comparative negligence statute in failing to
obtain sufficient information regarding his flight and in fail-
ing to overfly an unfamiliar field before landing. 9 '
,- 705 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
695 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Harr v. United States, 705 F.2d at 505-06; Beins v. United States, 695 F.2d at
600-05.
"' Harr v. United States, 705 F.2d at 505-06.
17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,738 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
Id. at 17,743.
Id. at 17,745.
695 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 989-90.
Id. at 990.
RECENT DE VEL OPMENTS
In Dyer v. United States,93 a federal court in Michigan held
that a pilot had been eighty percent negligent in failing to
heed advice against VFR flight, failing to update weather in-
formation, failing to check the weather en route and at his
destination, and failing to communicate flight conditions to
air traffic controllers. 94 The failure of the air traffic control-
lers to elicit information from the pilot, to properly record
weather conditions, and to indicate their intentions to the pi-
lot in handling his emergency constituted twenty percent
negligence on the part of the FAA.195 The court also held
that both pilots and air traffic controllers have concurrent
duties and responsibilities for the safety of flight.
196
In Doak v. United Slates,'97 an Arizona federal court held
that the failure of a pilot to maintain a proper lookout for
other aircraft constituted contributory negligence. The court
denied recovery because under Arizona law contributory neg-
ligence bars any recovery, even if the government is also neg-
ligent in providing air traffic control services.' 98
In Wallace v. UnitedStates,'99 a federal district court in Geor-
gia held that a pilot's failure to carry sufficient fuel on board
and to timely notify air traffic controllers of a fuel emergency
was the proximate cause of the resulting accident. Further-
more, the Wallace court found that there was no liability for
the alleged negligence on the part of the air traffic controllers
in South Carolina for failing to relay information to subse-
quent controllers in Florida who were handling the aircraft at
the time of its crash. The court reasoned that the crash was
in no way caused by the fact that the subsequent controllers
were unaware that the aircraft had experienced some navi-
gation, communication and instrument difficulties and that
the pilot had previously been notified of a minor course
551 F.Supp. 1266 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
" d at 1276-77, 1280.
Id. at 1277-80.
" Id. at 1275-76.
in 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,985 (D. Ariz. 1982).
- Id. at 17,987-88.
- 17 Av. Gas. (CCH) 18,066 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
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deviation which he corrected.2"' Finally, the Wallace court
considered the pilot's request, "we need vectors to the nearest
airport," following two missed approaches at his destination
insufficient to put controllers on notice of a potential fuel
emergency.°
In Hersch v. United States,2°2 the Sixth Circuit affirmed a
trial court's findings that the conduct of air traffic controllers
was not a proximate cause of an unexplained accident in
which the plaintiff alleged that wing tip vortices from a con-
verging aircraft had been the cause of the accident. The
Hersch court held that the trial court's findings that the air-
craft did not converge were not clearly erroneous. The appel-
late court further held that the trial judge was entitled to plot
courses himself based on his personal military and sailing ex-
perience in order to support his finding.20 3
In Keister v. United States,20 4 a Florida federal court held that
in an accident under instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC) in which the FAA provided all required weather infor-
mation, issued proper instructions under the air traffic con-
trol manual, and fulfilled all responsibilities required by law,
the inability of the pilot to control the aircraft under IMC
was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The court ex-
plained that pilots on instrument flight plans have the re-
sponsibility to control spatial disorientation and that the pilot
ultimately has the responsibility for the safe conduct of the
flight.20 5
VI. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE
CASES
A. Strict Products Liabilit
In McKay v. Rockwell Intl Corp., °6 the Ninth Circuit held
Id at 18,072.
" Id at 18,073-74.
719 F.2d 873 (6th Cir. 1983).
.. Id. at 878.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,101 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
- Id at 17,104.
- 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 711 (1984).
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that a manufacturer of a military aircraft could not be held
strictly liable in tort for the death of a military pilot allegedly
caused by a defective ejector seat. The court held that strict
liability does not apply to the manufacturer of military
equipment when the manufacturer proves that the equip-
ment was manufactured to government specifications, that
the manufacturer had warned the government of patent de-
fects in the specifications, and that the United States is im-
mune under the Feres-Stencel doctrine. 20 7 The court based its
decision to preclude strict liability in such cases on the
ground that the socio-economic justification for strict liability
does not apply with regard to the sale and use of military
equipment. °8
In James v. Bell Hel'copter Co.,2 °9 the Fifth Circuit faced the
issue of whether a claim against a helicopter manufacturer
for damage to a helicopter for pure economic loss allegedly
caused by a defective component part stated a strict liabiltiy
claim under Texas law. The court held that claims against
the manufacturer of the component part which caused the
damage to the helicopter were claims for damage to property
other than the component itself and therefore stated a strict
products liability claim under Texas law.2 '0 The court also
held, however, that the alleged strict liability claims against
the helicopter manufacturer were claims for pure economic
loss and were not recoverable under Texas law.21
In Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter,2f a Florida appellate court
held that strict liability will support a claim for punitive
damages under Florida law. In addition, the court held that
evidence that the manufacturer knew of the danger of acci-
dental door openings and failed to warn passengers or failed
to modify the airplane was sufficient to support a punitive
-1 Id at 451.
Id. at 451-53.
715 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1983), afg 491 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
Id. at 170-71.
Id at 170-72. See Robinson v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 4 Ohio Misc. 2d 6, 447
N.E.2d 781 (C.P. 1982) (holding that contributory negligence is not a defense to a
products liability case).
-2,2 426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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damages award.1 3
In Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 2 4 a California appellate
court held that a trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff to
make a collateral attack on the FAA certification of an air-
craft in order to attempt to prove a design defect based upon
a failure to comply with FAA regulations relating to the certi-
fication of aircraft.21 5 The Elsworth court also held that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury that if the plaintiff
proved that the aircraft design did not meet the requirements
of the FAA for type certification, then such failure might con-
stitute negligence per se.2 16 On the other hand, the fact that
the FAA had issued a type certificate and that the aircraft
had been manufactured in accordance with the type certifi-
cate did not preclude plaintiff from attempting to prove a
design defect or provide a complete defense to the manufac-
turer. In this case, however, the plaintiff failed to prove the
existence of such a design defect or that the manufacturer
had failed to warn of the operating precautions required of a
pilot in charge of his airplane. 217
In McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,2 " a California appellate
court expounded upon the peculiar burden of proof arising
under California products liability law. In McGee, the court
held that a jury verdict in favor of the defendant should be
reversed on the ground that the trial court did not properly
instruct the jury on the burden of proving proximate causa-
tion. The court explained that California products liability
law shifts the burden of proof on the issues of defect vel non
and proximate cause to the defendant once the plaintiff
proves a prima facie case that she was within the class pro-
tected by a regulation, that the defendant violated the regu-
lation, and that the injury resulted from an occurence the
regulation was designed to prevent.2 9 In addition, the Cali-
"' Id at 1109-10.




211 139 Cal. App. 3d 179, 188 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1983).
211 188 Cal. Rptr. at 546-50.
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fornia court held that evidence of pilot error would generally
not be admissible in crashworthiness cases, but because the
plaintiffs also sought to recover on alleged airworthiness de-
sign defects (so that the cause of the crash was in issue), evi-
dence of pilot error was admissible. 220 Finally, the California
court noted that while a product must be crashworthy, it
need not necessarily be crashproof.22'
In Gobhai v. KLM Royal Dutch Airih'nes,222 the New York
Supreme Court held that an air carrier which distributed
slippers to its first-class passengers was not liable under New
York strict products liability law for a fall allegedly caused by
those slippers. The passenger's mother allegedly slipped and
fell on a non-carpeted area of an apartment while wearing
the slippers. The court stated that the air carrier did not
manufacture or design the slippers, that there had been no
"sale" of the slippers, and that the distribution of such slip-
pers by the airline was merely incidental to the basic service
of air transportation.2 3
B. Res Ipsa Loquitur
In Ashland v. Ling Temco Vought, Inc.,224 the Ninth Circuit
held that, in order for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply
in multiple defendant cases, there must be a basis either for
vicarious liability among the multiple defendants or a basis
for finding that a breach of each defendant's independent
duty was more probably than not a contributing cause of the
crash. In Ashland, defendant LTV had performed extensive
modifications on a C-135 aircraft which was involved in a
mysterious crash over the South Pacific Ocean while being
operated by the United States Air Force. The court held that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be applied not only to the
United States, but also to LTV if the plaintiff carried her
burden of proof of showing that "LTV was more probably
- Id at 545-46.
22 Id. at 549 (citing Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1968)).
22 85 A.D.2d 566, 445 N.Y.S.2d 445, aft, 57 N.Y.2d 839, 442 N.E.2d 61, 455
N.Y.S.2d 764 (1982).
22:, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 446-47.
'24 711 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983).
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than not a contributing cause of the crash. '22 5 The court was
unable to determine based on the record, however, whether
the evidence would support such a finding, and the case was
remanded to the trial court for a trial limited to those
221issues.
In Tompkins v. Northwestern Union Trust Co.,227 the Montana
Supreme Court addressed a similar issue and held that the
doctrine of res ipsa loqutur may be applied to a claim arising
from the alleged negligence of a pilot, even though the de-
fendant also produced evidence of equipment failure. The
Tompkins court held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff
to prove that the pilot of the aircraft had exclusive control of
all aspects of maintenance, inspection, and operation of the
aircraft in order for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be ap-
plied to claims arising from the pilot's alleged negligence. 2 8
Instead, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to ajury
charge on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur even though there
had been evidence of equipment failure. The court indicated
that under the facts of the case the jury could have found
that the pilot's negligence could have combined with such
equipment failure to proximately cause the accident. 22 9
Finally, in Winans v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,2 30 the Fifth Circuit
held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not be applied in
claims against a defendant repair facility where all possible
tortfeasors are not joined and where the evidence does not
negate the possibility of fault on behalf of the plaintiff. The
Fifth Circuit noted that the repair facility did not exercise
control over the aircraft at the time of the accident and that
there was no showing that others with control were free from
fault.23' Yet, when an aircraft had been within the exclusive
control of one defendant, the Alaska Supreme Court held
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquiur applied, stating that air
, Id at 1440.
Id at 1441.
w 645 P.2d 402 (Mont. 1982).
.. Id. at 406.
SId
20 705 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1983).
: Id at 1454-55.
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carrier accidents generally do not occur without
negligence.232
C. Persons Liable
Two cases considered the issue of airport operator liability
during the survey period. In Alitaia-Linee Aeree I/ahane v.
United States,233 the district court in Massachusetts held that
the failure of the airport operator to exercise reasonable care
in clearing runways, inspecting the airport, and failing to
provide adequate information to the aircraft crew regarding
the height of snowbanks constituted negligence which proxi-
mately caused damage to an aircraft.234 In Osibov v. State of
Washington,235 however, a Washington appellate court held
that the failure of an airport operator to advise the FAA of
construction on an airport (in contravention of FAA regula-
tions) did not constitute negligence per se since the purpose of
the regulations was to allow the FAA to review construction
and not necessarily to provide notice to pilots.
236
Also, in Puritan Insurance Co. v. Butler Aviation-Palm Beach,23 7
the Eleventh Circuit held that a fixed base operator had con-
trol over aircraft at its facility and became a bailee where it
maintained a fence around the aircraft, controlled access to
the area, and registered and parked all aircraft in its posses-
sion. The court did not consider the fact that the aircraft
owner retained the key to the aircraft dispositive of the bail-
ment issue. The court noted, however, that no ignition key
was necessary to start the aircraft in question.238
D. Contribution and Indemnity
In Herndon v. Seven Bar Foithg Service,239 the Tenth Circuit
decided that, even though New Mexico had adopted compar-
212 Widmyer v. Southwest Skyways, 584 P.2d I (Alaska 1978).
..... 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,160 (D. Mass. 1982).
21 Id. at 18,161-65.
i31 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,110 (Wash. App. 1982).
2:11 Id at 18,111-12.
.... 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,201 (lith Cir. 1983).
z, Id at 17,201-02.
'-. 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983).
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ative fault, traditional indemnity principles continue to apply
between joint tortfeasors. The court held that under such in-
demnity principles, a mechanic who fails to discover a defect
is entitled to indemnification from a manufacturer of the de-
fective component. The court rejected an argument that the
comparative fault rules under New Mexico law supplanted
the former indemnity rule based upon active and passive neg-
ligence, even though the proportionate share of liability to
the plaintiff had been determined at the trial court.24 °
E. Evidence
Two cases during the past year dealt with testimony con-
cerning National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) inves-
tigations. In Swell v. Schenk,24 ' a California trial court held
that an NTSB investigator cannot claim a privilege for state-
ments which were made to the NTSB investigator by an em-
ployee of a party to litigation, and that the NTSB
investigator may testify as to all but the opinions of the Board
in regard to the ultimate cause of the accident.24 2 In McGee v.
Cessna Aircraft Co.,243 a California appellate court held that an
FAA employee who is a party to an NTSB investigation may
testify to the facts surrounding the investigation and as to
standard calculations, but not as to opinions and conclusions
based upon the investigation.244
In Freeman v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,245 the Ohio Court of Ap-
peals held that only those portions of an NTSB report, in-
cluding calculations, which are based on firsthand knowledge
of the investigator are admissible under Ohio law. The court
refused to admit those portions of the report not based on the
observations of the investigator.246 The court noted that
Ohio did not adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(c) 2 7 re-
21" Id at 1331-32.
24 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,106 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1983).
242 Id at 17,106-08.
i':1 139 Cal. App. 3d 179, 188 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1983).
24 188 Cal. Rptr. at 551-52.
245 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
24 Id. at 17,288.
141 OHIO EVID. R. 803(8) (Page 1981) deleted a portion of its federal counterpart
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garding the admissibility of portions of a report which are not
within the first-hand knowledge of a government
investigator. 4
As to the admissibility of post-accident events, the Tenth
Circuit in Hemdon v. Seven Bar Fly'ing Service,2 4 9 held that post-
accident service bulletins are admissible under Federal Rule
of Evidence 407 in strict liability actions. The court stated
that Rule 407's exclusion of subsequent remedial measures
for the purpose of showing culpability was not applicable to
strict liability actions because culpability is not at issue and
the remedial measures are of value in proving the existence of
a defect. 250 In addition, the Herndon court added that airwor-
thiness directives are admissible because they are required by
law, and the policy of encouraging post-accident remedial
measures does not apply when the post-accident remedial
measures are required by law.2 5'
Contrarily, in Freeman v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,252 an Ohio ap-
pellate court held that a post-accident report regarding re-
vised recommended safe single engine inoperative speeds for
various aircraft is inadmissible in a strict liability case to
prove that pre-accident warnings and data were incorrect or
inadequate. 25 3 And in James v. Bell Helicopter Co. ,254 the Fifth
Circuit refused to overrule the exclusion under Rule 407 of
post-accident tests in the absence of a sufficient offer of proof
as to the purpose for tendering the remedial measures into
evidence.255
In Kastner v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,256 a Missouri appellate
which would have permitted the admission of public records containing "factual find-
ings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law." Id
at 17,286.
241 See id. at 17,286-88. See also Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Evans, 424 So. 2d 586 (Ala.
1982) (holding that FAA reports introduced to prove notice to the manufacturer of
potential muffler hazards were not inadmissible as hearsay).
716 F.2d at 1326-29.
I d.
Id. at 1331.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
25:1 Id at 17,289-90.
- 715 F.2d 166, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1983).
25 Id
', 650 S.W.2d 312 (Mo. 1983).
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court held that reports and recommendations of the NTSB
are admissible where they do not include "probable cause"
findings. The court also held that recommendations concern-
ing other accidents are relevant to the issue of notice and are
admissible to rehabilitate a witness who on cross-examination
was asked whether anyone shared his opinions as to the exist-
ence of defects.2 57 The NTSB report was introduced to show
that the NTSB concurred in the witness' opinions. Finally,
the court concluded that such NTSB reports were not inad-
missible as hearsay because they fell under an exception to
the hearsay rule for official reports prepared pursuant to stat-
utory authority. 258
In Radke v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,259 the Eighth Circuit held
that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
defendant to present evidence of other litigation arising from
the same accident and involving a particular witness in order
to show bias or interest of the witness. In addition, the Radke
court upheld the admissibility of a felony drug conviction af-
ter balancing the probative value of the evidence against the
possible prejudice where the witness was the only person to
provide any testimony whatsoever of a defect in the aircraft
which may have caused the accident.2 °
Finally, in Unted States v. Weber Aircraft Corp.,261 the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case involving
whether statements made in confidence by witnesses in an Air
Force air crash safety investigation are protected from disclo-
sure under exemption five of the Freedom of Information Act
(FIA).262 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that such
confidential witness statements are not exempt from disclo-
sure under exemption five of the FIA. The Ninth Circuit sug-
251 Id at 318.
-n Id at 319. See Walker v. Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650, 651-53 (D. Nev.
1982) (holding that certain military accident reports may be admissible under FED. R.
EvID. 803(8)(c), including evaluative opinions and conclusions, based on the timing of
the report and the skill of the investigator and other indicia of trustworthiness).
2- 707 F.2d 999, 1001-02 (8th Cir. 1983).
21. Id
21; 688 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1499 (1983).
- 51 U.S.L.W. 3811 <U.S. May 10, 1983).
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gested that to interpret the FIA as exempting confidential
witness statements prepared as a part of an Air Force collat-
eral investigation would involve judicial amendment and cre-
ate the evil which Congress sought to avoid in passing the
FIA.263
F. Burden of Proof
In two cases during the survey period, federal appellate
courts affirmed directed verdicts in favor of manufacturers on
the ground that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of
proof in establishing that a design defect proximately caused
the accident involved in the cases. In Hersch v. United Slates,2 64
the Sixth Circuit affirmed a trial court holding that the evi-
dence was insufficient to show that the alleged design defects
proximately caused the accident. The Hersch court held that
a directed verdict in favor of the defendant manufacturer was
proper because the plaintiff was unable to tilt the scales on
the issue of causation from a mere "possiblity" to a
"probability." The court added that a jury should not be per-
mitted to engage in speculation and conjecture on the issue of
causation.265
In Browne v. McDonnell Douglas,26 6 the Ninth Circuit held
that in order to avoid a directed verdict, a plaintiff must pres-
ent substantial evidence that would rationally support the
conclusion that a design defect proximately caused the acci-
dent. Moreover, the Browne court rejected the plaintiff's ar-
gument that broader inferences are justified in air crash cases
than in other cases. 267 The court stated that "it is not the law
that in aircraft crash cases everyone sued must pay. '268
..... 688 F.2d at 644. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that
confidential statements made to military air crash safety investigators are "Inter-
Agency Memoranda" not routinely available to a private party in pre-trial discovery
and as such are protected from disclosure by exemption five of the FIA. United States
v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1488 (1984). [Eds.].
21A 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,291 (6th Cir. 1983).
265 Id at 17,295.
- 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,908 (9th Cir. 1982).
- Id at 17,909.
2- Id (citing Leversen v. Boeing Co., 510 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1975)).
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VII. AIR CARRIER LIABILITY
A. Warsaw Convention
1. Jurisdiction and Venue
The Second Circuit held in Gayda v. LOT Pohsh Ai'rlzne,, 69
that the venue provisions of the Warsaw Convention (Con-
vention)27° are jurisdictional, and that a federal court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff files a claim
governed by the Convention in a place other than the venue
specified.2 1' The Gayda court grounded its decisions in the
Convention's very precise venue provisions which require
that the claim be filed in one of the following locations:
(1) The domicile of the defendant;
(2) The principal place of business of the defendant;
(3) The place of formation of the contract of carriage; or
(4) The ultimate destination under the contract of
carriage. 212
In Hurley v. KLMRoyal Dutch Airhnes,273 a California federal
court held that the place of destination under a round trip
ticket from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia was California in a case in
which Santa Barbara, California was the destination on only
one leg of the trip. The court adopted a "common sense"
interpretation of destination (as employed in the venue provi-
sions of the Convention), holding that at least two places of
destination exist in a round trip ticket. The court then added
that the determination of whether a particular stop consti-
tutes a destination is to be determined by taking into account
such factors as the passenger's intent, the nature of the stop
and the length of the stop. 274
In PT Aifast Services, Indonesia v. Superior Court of S'skyou
County,275 a California appellate court held that where there
-" 702 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1983).
2 70 See supra note 136.
7,, 704 F.2d at 425.
2,. Id (quoting Convention, supra note 136, at art. 28).
2,:, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,151 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
274 Id at 17,152.
2, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,087 (Cal. App. 1983).
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was not a single contract for individual travel by successive
carriers, a "destination" existed for each segment of the jour-
ney. The court rejected an argument which, in substance,
would have determined "destination" by the passenger's uni-
lateral expectations as to his ultimate destination.276
Finally, in Hiv. UnitedAirlines,277 a federal district court in
Kansas held that article 28(1) of the Convention establishes
jurisdiction within a particular country and does not address
issues of jurisdiction and venue of a particular court within
the United States. The court stated, therefore, that once ju-
risdiction and venue are established in the United States
under article 28(1) the issues of jurisdiction and venue in a
particular American court are controlled by domestic law.2 78
In addition the Hill court held that the Convention did not
limit liability for the common law tort of intentional misrep-
resentation and further held that a claim for punitive dam-
ages fell within the willful misconduct exception.2 79
2. App /'cabi/ity
The applicability of the Convention was addressed in sev-
eral cases during the survey period. In two cases, the applica-
bility of the Convention to embarking and disembarking
accidents was discussed. In fact, the two cases involved falls
on the same or similar sets of escalators in New York. In Cur-
ran v. Aer Lingus,280 a New York federal district court held that
the air carrier was not liable for injuries under the Warsaw
Convention when a passenger on an international flight fell
on an escalator while going to the customs area of the airport.
The court found that the passenger was not "disembarking"
under either the location of the accident test or the control by
the carrier test. The court chose not to hold either test deter-
minative of "disembarking" however, because the outcome
was the same under both.281
2 7 Id. at 18,090.
-7 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,100 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
-'" Id at 18,104.
, Id at 18,105.
17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,560 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
281 Id at 17,561-62.
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In Rolnick v. El Al Israel Airhhes,282 another federal court in
New York held that a passenger on an escalator who had
checked his baggage and obtained a boarding pass, but had
not yet entered the passport control area or an area con-
trolled by the air carrier, could not recover under the Con-
vention for his injuries sustained. The court applied the
"fluid" analysis under Day v. Trans World Airlines,283 in deter-
mining that the passenger's activities did not constitute em-
barkation on the international flight.
28 4
In a case concerning property damage claims, a federal dis-
trict court in New York in Railroad Salvage of Connecticut v. Ja-
pan Freight Consolidators (USA), 285 held that once the goods are
delivered by the airlines to a motor carrier, the air travel asso-
ciated with the goods has been terminated and the limita-
tions on liability set forth in the Convention do not apply.
Similarly, in Lerakoh, Inc. v. Pan American World Airwas,
2 8 6 the
same federal court held that the Convention, by its terms,
does not apply to international mail shipments. The court
stated, however, that the liability of Pan Am, a sub-bailee,
would not exceed the liability of the United States Postal Ser-
vice, the bailee, unless Pan Am intentionally converted the
lost parcels.287
Finally, in Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlhne System, 288 a Maryland
federal court held that a claim for negligence arising from an
intoxicated passenger falling on another passenger was an
"accident" within the meaning of the Convention. 289 Hence,
the court held that the claims against the defendant air car-
rier were barred by the two year statute of limitations of Arti-
cle 29 of the Convention. 290
- 551 F. Supp. 261 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
-2m, 551 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). The Rolnick court
described the test as "tripartite", focusing on "activity (what the plaintiffs were doing),
control (at whose direction), and location." 551 F. Supp. at 263.
284 Id
556 F. Supp. 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
2 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,107 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
-, Id. at 18,108.
2 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,283 (D. Md. 1983).
- Id. at 18,284.
Id. at 18,284-85.
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3. Notice of Liabiliy Limitations
In In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 141,
1980,291 the Second Circuit held that an airline which fails to
comply with the type-size requirements for the notice of limi-
tations on liability could not avail itself of the liability limits
of the Convention or invoke the defense to liability provided
under the Convention. Notably, the failure of the airline to
comply with the type requirements consisted entirely of using
type size which was 15/270ths of an inch too small. 2
92
In Mahmoud v. Ahtalia A'ihnes,293 a New York federal dis-
trict court rejected a plaintiffs contention that she should
have been provided with the treaty limitation information in
her native language (Arabic). The court rejected the plain-
tiff's contention because of the practical difficulties which
would arise if tickets were required to be printed in languages
which all passengers could understand. 94 Instead, the Mah-
moud court stated that "it seems more reasonable and consis-
tent with the treaty's policies to require passengers to ask for
translations, if necessary.
2 95
4. Notice of Claims
In Amazon Coffee Co. v. Trans World Airlines,296 a New York
state court held that neither actual knowledge of a loss, nor
inspection of damaged property by airline investigators
waived the notice of damage requirements under the Con-
vention. The court observed that the Convention clearly re-
quires notice in writing within seven days from the date of
receipt of goods before an action would lie.29 7 In addition,
the court held that the willful misconduct exception con-
tained in the Convention relates only to monetary limits and
does not waive or change the time limits for filing claims. 98
705 F.2d 85, 86-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 147 (1983).
.. 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,598 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Id at 17,599.
5 Id.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
-' Id (quoting Convention, supra note 136, at art. 26).
- Id at 17,265.
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In Dresser Industries v. KLM Royal Dutch Airl'nes,299 a Texas
federal district court barred, in a motion for summary judg-
ment, a property damage claim under both the seven day no-
tice provision of the Convention and also under the 120-day
notice provision of the air carrier's tariff filed with the CAB.
Moreover, the court rejected any argument based upon lack
of CAB authority over tariffs concerning foreign air transpor-
tation since the plaintiff had failed to present evidence suffi-
cient to create an issue of fact on that point. 00
5. Limitation on Liability
By far the most significant development relating to the
Convention during the survey period has been the considera-
tion by the United States Supreme Court of Franklin Mint
Corp. v. Trans World Airlines.3 ° In its grant of certiorari, the
Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the Warsaw Con-
vention's limitation on liability for loss of air cargo is enforce-
able notwithstanding Congress' abandonment of the unit of
gold conversion specified by the Convention and whether the
determination of a proper conversion factor for gold franc
provisions is justifiable, and if so, what that factor is.3°2
Notwithstanding the grant of certiorari in Franklin Mint,
several courts during the survey period have addressed the
issue of the appropriate limitation on liability under the War-
saw Convention since the United States has abandoned an
official price of gold. Most significantly, in In re crash at Kimpo
International Airport, Korea, on November 18, 1980,303 the United
States District Court for the Central District of California fol-
lowed the Second Circuit holding in the Frankhn Mint case.
The Kimpo court held that since the United States no longer
17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,293 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
Id at 18,294.
:' 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3084 (1983).
M2 103 S. Ct. 3084 (1983). The Supreme Court held that the repeal of the Par Value
Modification Act in 1978 did not affect the enforceability of the Convention. The
Court also concluded that the last official price of gold is the appropriate factor for
converting the liability limits of the Convention into United States dollars. Trans
World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984). [Eds.]
- 558 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
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has an official price of gold, the liability limitations of the
Convention are not enforceable with regard to the claims
arising under the Convention." 4
On the other hand, an Illinois federal court twice held that
the last official price of gold in the United States sets the limi-
tation on liability. The court reasoned that this standard
most nearly effectuates the purpose of the Convention. In
Deere & Co. v. Ag Deutsche Luflhansa, A.G,3°5 and in Mas-
chinenfabrk Kern, A. . v. Northwest Airli'nes,316 the Illinois court
held the limitation on liability under the Convention to be
enforceable and the measure of the liability limitation to be
established by reference to the last official price of gold in the
United States.
6. Miscellaneous
In a particularly interesting case, a New York federal court
held, in Hexter v. Air France,30 7 that the carrying of a passen-
ger's overnight bag by a flight attendant on board an aircraft
may constitute acceptance of baggage by the air carrier such
that issuance of a baggage check is necessary to perserve the
air carrier's right to limit liability. The court held that when
an air carrier removes baggage from a "passenger's charge,"
the carrier thereby accepts the baggage within the meaning
of Article 4(4) of the Convention, and must issue a baggage
check to preserve its right to limit liability.
30 8
Finally, two Circuit Courts of Appeal reached diametri-
cally opposed conclusions with regard to the recoverability of
pre-judgment and post-judgment interest in addition to the
liability limits established under the Convention as amended
by the Montreal Agreement. In O'Rourke v. Eastern Airlines,3°9
'" Id at 74-75.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,178, 17,179 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
562 F. Supp. 232, 239-40 (N.D. 11. 1983).
17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,054 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Id at 18,056.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,763 (2d Cir. 1984). The aircraft accident occurred on June
24, 1975, when Eastern Airlines Flight 66, en route from New Orleans to New York
City, crashed on its approach to John F. Kennedy International Airport, Queens, New
York. Id. at 17,764.
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the Second Circuit did not allow the plaintiff to recover pre-
judgment interest in addition to a maximum $75,000 recov-
ery under the Convention. The court held that the $75,000
limitation on liability was inclusive of legal fees and costs and
that no additional interest could be awarded. 10 Conversely,
in Domangue v. Eastern Aihnes,"' the Fifth Circuit held that
pre-judgment interest may be awarded over the $75,000 limi-
tation in order to ensure the speedy disposition of claims and
a more adequate recovery.31 2 The Fifth Circuit also held in
Domangue that post-judgment interest may be awarded in or-
der to encourage speedy compensation for damages. 3
B. Other Air Carrier Cases
The liability of air carriers under a negligence theory was
addressed in Sporn v. Metro International Airways3 4 In Sporn, a
New York trial court ruled, in response to a motion for sum-
mary judgment, that an action for breach of contract does
not lie for the failure of an airline to keep its schedule where
the passenger tickets indicated that the timetable was not
guaranteed. Nevertheless, the court indicated that when an
airline undertakes to publish a schedule, it may be liable if it
negligently fails to keep the schedule by delaying takeoff. In
Sporn the takeoff was delayed for three hours to permit the
filming of the aircraft for a movie production. 5
In addition, two cases during the survey period held that
an air carrier may be subject to liability as a bailee for lost
baggage. In Tremaroh v. Delta Airlines,3 6 a New York trial
court held that baggage delivered to an airline for security
check creates a bailment and the failure to return the bag-
gage constitutes prima facie evidence of conversion or negli-
Id. at 17,767-69.
722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984).
Id at 262-64. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a com-
panion case involving this issue, Eastern Airlines v. Mahfoud, 53 U.S.L.W. 3200 (Oct.
2, 1984).
Id at 262.
17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
Id at 18,207-08.
117 Misc. 2d 484, 458 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983).
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gence. Similarly, in Loewensline v. Delta Airlines,31 7 the Ohio
Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff established a prima fa-
cie case under a bailment theory when certain camera equip-
ment was allegedly removed from a camera case checked as
luggage.
In cases not involving conversion under a bailment theory,
the tariff limitations on liability have generally been applied.
In Shlulman v. Eastern Smelling & Refining Corp. ,318 a Massachu-
setts trial court held that an air carrier is not liable for lost
shipment of precious metal scraps where the shipper lists the
cargo as scrap metal waste, and not as precious metal, and
the tariff does not allow the carrier to accept precious metals
for shipment. The court held that the tariff is binding on the
shipper notwithstanding his lack of knowledge or consent to
it319it. '
In the area of overbooking, the results of two cases indicate
that there is no liability for overbooking in the absence of
fraud, malice, or oppression in the overbooking, that the
mere practice of overbooking does not constitute fraud or a
deceptive trade practice, and that airlines are under no duty
to disclose the overbooking. In Biswas v. Briltsh Airways,320 a
California federal court granted summary judgment in favor
of an air carrier where the carrier had no intent not to pro-
vide the services when the ticket was sold. Similarly, in Men-
delson v. TWA, 32' a New York trial court held that there was
no fraud, deceptive trade practice, or warranty claim arising
from overbooking practices. The court stated, however, that
an air carrier which fails to follow its own procedures in alle-
viating the effects of overbooking may be liable for discrimi-
nation under the provisions of section 404(b) of the Federal
Aviation Act.3 2
In another case involving the right of carriers to refuse
boarding, a federal court in New York held in Mahler v. Amer-
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,343 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,026 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1982).
Id. at 18,028.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,104 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
120 Misc. 2d 423, 466 N.Y.S.2d 168 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
3... 466 N.Y.S.2d at 171 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1374b (1982)).
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can Airines323 that an "attempted" bumping claim stated a
cause of action, even though the passenger was not actually
bumped from the flight. The court held that the purpose of
section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act is to prohibit dis-
crimination in air carriage, regardless of whether such dis-
crimination ultimately results in a refusal of
transportation.324
On the other hand, the determination by an air carrier of
whether to carry a sick or invalid person rests within the dis-
cretion of the carrier according to the New York Court of
Appeals in Adamson v. American Atihnes.3 25 The standard to be
applied in reviewing such discretion is whether the action of
the carrier, under the facts and circumstances known at the
time of making the decision to deny transportation, was arbi-
trary, capricious or irrational, constituting an abuse of the
discretion vested by law in the carrier." 6
Finally, the discretion of air carriers in denying transporta-
tion was broadly applied in the case of Zervzgnon v. Pdmont
Avtation.32 1 In Zervignon, the court rejected the plaintiffs' alle-
gations that their involuntary removal from an aircraft vio-
lated the nondiscriminatory provisions of section 404(b) of
the Federal Aviation Act. The captain of the aircraft ordered
removal of a group of passengers after one of the group had
assaulted a stewardess, and other members of the group made
other passengers apprehensive about the possibility of hi-
jacking.3 28 The court held that the captain of the aircraft was
justified, under section I 111 of the Act, in removing such pas-
sengers from the aircraft based upon a reasonable concern for
the safety of the aircraft and its passengers. 29
..... 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,203 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
:- Id at 18,204.
:12r, 58 N.Y.2d 42, 444 N.E.2d 21, 457 N.Y.S.2d 771, 774 (1982), cert. dented, 103 S. Ct.
3540 (1983).
:'121 457 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
:427 558 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
:128 Id.
:12 Id
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VIII. INSURANCE
A. Liabihty Insurance
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Rck, 330 the Arizona
Supreme Court held that an aircraft insurance policy may
properly exclude coverage to renter pilots, even though the
purpose-of-use clause in the policy provides coverage to the
named insured for aircraft rental operations. The court also
held that a motor vehicle statute requiring liability coverage
to be provided to renters does not apply to aircraft. Further-
more, the Rick court stated that there is no inconsistency in
providing coverage to the owner-operator of an aircraft for
rental operations, and at the same time excluding liability
coverage to the renter pilot.
33 1
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. North Seattle Christian & M'ssion-
ary Alliance,332 the Washington Court of Appeals considered
whether a liability insurance policy, which was issued to a
church and included within its coverage stockholders of the
insured, covered a church member piloting the church's
plane when it crashed. The court reasoned that the member,
who was not an employee of the church, was performing no
duties analogous to those of a stockholder by piloting the
plane. The court therefore held that the pilot/member was
not insured as a stockholder. 33
The types of claims which may be covered under a particu-
lar policy listing an additional insured was considered in Piper
Aircraft Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America. 34 In this case, a
Pennsylvania trial court held that an aircraft manufacturer
that is a lessor of an aircraft and listed as an additional in-
sured under the lessee's liability policy is entitled to full cov-
erage. The court added that the coverage includes the
conduct of a defense in a wrongful death action, even though
the recovery sought against the manufacturer is in its capac-
ity as the designer and manufacturer of the aircraft and not
.. 134 Ariz. 122, 654 P.2d 56 (1982).
654 P.2d at 61-63.
17 Av. Gas. (CCH) 18,268 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
Id at 18,271.
3... 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,051 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
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solely as the owner and the lessor of the aircraft. 35 The Piper
court reasoned that the endorsement adding Piper Aircraft as
an insured, "but only as respects their interest as
owner/lessor" of the particular aircraft was intended to ex-
clude the manufacturer's interest in aircraft other than the
particular aircraft identified in the policy. 36 In this regard,
the court held that the word "interest" may be interpreted to
address interest in the particular aircraft, and not the capac-
ity in which the additional insured aircraft manufacturer is
claimed to be liable for damages arising from accidents in-
volving the particular aircraft 33
In Fort Myers Airways v. American States Insurance Co.,338 the
Florida Court of Appeals refused to extend coverage under a
flying student's policy to the employer of the insured's flight
instructor, although it had previously held that the flight in-
structor was covered by the policy. In holding that the flight
instructor was covered, the court previously concluded that
the instructor was an "agent or employee" of the insured stu-
dent and therefore specifically covered by the policy. The
court was not persuaded, however, that the instructor's em-
ployer was under a sufficient degree of control and direction
to be an agent of the student.3 39
B. General Exclusions
Co-employee and crew member exclusions were the subject
of a number of cases during the survey period. In Figueroa v.
United States,34° the court did not exclude from coverage
under the co-employee exclusionary clause the claim against
an employee pilot arising from the deaths of two co-employ-
ees. The court held that both the pilot's employer and the
pilot could be "insureds" under the omnibus insurance clause
and therefore independently provided with coverage under
m' Id at 18,052-53.
33iId
137 Id
... 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
:s Id
,, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,785 (D.P.R. 1983).
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the policy.3 4 ' The court pointed out that the named insured
under the policy was not the employer of the pilot and his co-
employees and that the pilot was using the plane with per-
mission of the named insured. 42
In Ranger Insurance Co. v. Ram Flying Club,343 a Colorado ap-
pellate court held that an aircraft insurance policy excluding
coverage for bodily injury to any person who is a pilot or
crew member excludes coverage for injuries sustained by a
student pilot. The student pilot performed the pre-flight in-
spection, started and taxied the aircraft, took off, and per-
formed maneuvers. The instructor, however, was operating
the aircraft at the time of the crash. The Ranger court noted
that both of the pilots were crew members because they were
"associated together for purposes of operating an aircraft be-
tween different points or during a certain time interval. 3
44
A similar case was presented in Beckwith v. American Home
Assurance Co.345 In Beckwth, a North Carolina federal court
held that whether or not a person is a crew member depends
on the status of the person throughout the flight, and not at
the "moment of impact. ' 346 Even though the status of a per-
son arguably could change over the course of a flight if only
one crew member was required for the operation of the air-
craft, the court held that a person may not act as a crew
member throughout the flight and then change his status by
relinquishing control of the aircraft when a crisis develops.347
An exclusion for "property under the control of the in-
sured" was considered in Godwin Sprayers, Inc. v. Utica Mutual
Insurance Co.348 The North Carolina appellate court consid-
ered whether a United States Department of Agriculture air-
craft in the possession of an insured was "property under the
control of the insured" and therefore excluded from cover-
Id at 17,787.
Id. at 17,785-87.
:14:, 653 P.2d 65 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
:... Id at 66-67.
345 18 Av. Cas.(CCH) 17,302 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
.. ; Id. at 17,304.
347 Id
:i 7 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,093 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
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age. 49 The court held that there was an issue of fact as to
whether the aircraft is "property under the control of the in-
sured" when the insured maintains and has access to the air-
craft at its own airport, but only operates it on specific flights
under the direction of Department of Agriculture
employees. 5 °
The Arizona Court of Appeals considered the exclusion for
flights for which a "charge" is made in FlagstaffMortuary, Inc.
v. Gamble. 51 The court held that in a case in which it is undis-
puted that payment is a condition for use of an aircraft, a
"charge" for use of the aircraft exists when a payment is
made in excess of direct operating expenses.3 52
Finally, in a particularly interesting case, Gelder v. Puritan
Insurance Co.,353 the New Mexico Court of Appeals considered
whether coverage was excluded under a clause excepting
from coverage any damage resulting from conversion, where
an aircraft, in breach of the lease agreement, crashed while
being used for transportation of controlled substances. The
appellate court agreed with the trial court that conversion
occurred when the plane crashed. The court then held that
the exclusion for conversion applied even though the aircraft
had unloaded its illegal drugs, was in the process of taking
off, and arguably was being returned to its lawful purposes at
the time of the accident. 54
C. Compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations, Pilot
Qualifications and Airworthiness Certifcate Exclusions
This area produced a diversity of opinions during the sur-
vey period. For example, in Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lu-
cas,355 an unpublished decision, a Georgia federal district
court held that a pilot failed to meet the pilot warranty re-
,149 Id at 18,094.
-~ Id
135 Ariz. 474, 662 P.2d 149 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
" Id at 151-52.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,370 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
Id. at 17,371, (citing Swish Mfg. Southeast v. Manhattan Fire & Marine Ins., 675
F.2d 1218 (11th Cir. 1982)).
:1, No. C82-88G, slip op. (N.D. Ga., Sept. 27, 1983).
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quirements of 100 hours, because he only had 96.8 hours.
The court, therefore, denied coverage under the policy. No-
tably, the insurer also based its denial of coverage on the
grounds that the pilot lacked the required pilot certificates
and ratings for the flight and that the aircraft was being used
for a non-covered use. The court, however, chose to base
summary judgment for the insurer on the pilot's failure to
meet the pilot flight-time requirements. 56
In Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Alfa Aviation,357 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the failure of a
renter pilot to have a valid and effective medical certificate as
required under a pilot endorsement clause constitutes a
proper basis for denial of coverage, regardless of whether a
causal connection existed between the failure to meet the re-
quirement and the accident from which the claim of coverage
arose. In addition, the court denied coverage to the owner of
the leased aircraft, Alfa Aviation, under a separate airport
liability policy because the policy expressly excluded cover-
age for "any aircraft owned by, hired by, loaned to or oper-
ated for the account of the insured. '358
In Bonanza of Cleveland v. Fairfax Underwrters Services,359 an
Ohio appellate court considered the pilot endorsement of a
flying club's policy which limited coverage to operation of the
aircraft either by certain named individuals or by members
of the flying club "having an ownership interest in the flying
club, or owning stock in the corporation (if the flying club is
incorporated). ' 360 The pilot operating the aircraft at the
time of the accident did not meet this requireinent. The in-
surer consequently denied coverage for a property damage
claim arising out of the operation of the aircraft by the pilot.
The court reviewed the requirement for "an ownership inter-
est" and concluded that the requirement was a proper basis
for denial of coverage because "[o]wners may have a greater
" Id at 3.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,447 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
x, Id at 17,449.
x, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,444 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
- Id at 17,445.
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interest in protecting their property than nonowners."361 The
court also rejected the insured's argument that the omnibus
insurance clause conflicted with the pilot endorsement and
created an ambiguity as to who could use the aircraft and
still be covered. The court noted that the omnibus insurance
clause merely identified the persons entitled to coverage if
coverage otherwise was provided under the terms and condi-
tions of the policy, including the conditions and requirements
of the pilot endorsement. 62
In Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Limerick Aviation Co.,363 a
Pennsylvania federal court held that an insurer has no duty
to provide a defense where a pilot does not meet the pilot
requirements of total flight time, multi-engine flight time or
time in make and model, and the aircraft is not being used
for the "pleasure or business" of the named insured, but for
the "air charter" business of another.36 The Ideal court also
based its decision on the ground that the pilot made false
statements regarding past accidents, past damage history and
past cancellations on his application for insurance.
65
In a somewhat similar case, Master Feeders II, Inc. v. United
States Fire Insurance Co.,366 the Tenth Circuit reasoned that
where an unqualified pilot flies an aircraft for its entire flight,
the fact that a qualified pilot takes the controls just prior to
an accident, does not render the exclusionary clause inappli-
cable. Accordingly, the court held that coverage was not pro-
vided under the policy.3 67
In Federal Insurance Co. v. Bahari Aviaton,368 a New York fed-
eral court held as a valid exclusion the requirement that the
co-pilot of a business jet be a graduate of an approved manu-
facturer school to be a valid exclusion, even though the co-
pilot has arguably received "equivalent" training. The court
Id at 17,446-47.
550 F. Supp. 437 (ED. Pa. 1982).
id. at 440.
Id. at 440-41.
17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,205 (10th Cir. 1983).
Ni7 Id at 18,206-07.
- 18 Av. Cas. 17,141 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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also held that there is no waiver or estoppel based upon previ-
ous approval by the insurer of specifically named pilots who
have not completed the manufacturer's approved school, but
have received the equivalent training. 69
In contrast, one recent case held that failure to meet the
pilot and aircraft airworthiness certification requirements of
a policy does not result in an exclusion of coverage. In Florida
Power &Lzght Co. v. Foremost Insurance Co.,370 the Florida Court
of Appeals held that under a recent state statute,37' violation
of a pilot warranty does not constitute grounds for denial of
coverage unless the violation increases the hazard of loss or
injury. In Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. O'Brian,373 however,
the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed an appellate court
decision which held that absent a causal connection between
the accident and the grounds for the policy exclusion, the in-
surer could not deny coverage.174  The New Mexico court
noted that the policy exclusions provide much incentive for
aircraft owners to comply with FAA regulations.3 75 Hence
the court held that the coverage may be denied even though
there is no causal connection between the exclusion clause
and the accident.376
The frequently addressed question of whether a VFR pilot
has the requisite qualifications for a flight in instrument me-
teorological conditions when the flight departs in VFR condi-
tions was considered in Marr's Short Stop of Texas v. United
SMd at 17,143.
:.... 433 So. 2d 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
... FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.409(2) (Supp. 1984) provides:
(2) A breach or violation by the insured of any warranty, condition,
or provision of any wet marine or transportation insurance policy, con-
tract of insurance, endorsement, or application therefor shall not render
void the policy or contract, or constitute a defense to a loss thereon, un-
less such breach or violation increased the hazard by any means within
the control of the insured.
7172 433 So. 2d at 536-37.
1'7 99 N.M. 638, 662 P.2d 639 (1983).
:114 662 P.2d at 640.
17, Id at 641.
'71i Id
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States Fire Insurance Co.311 In Marr's, a Texas appellate court
held that whether a flight is VFR or IFR depends on the
weather conditions at the commencement of the flight. Thus,
the appellate court regarded as "immaterial" the finding that
the pilot knew he would be flying into IFR weather condi-
tions where the conditions were VFR at the beginning of the
flight.378
The effect of CAB and FAA regulations requiring compul-
sory liability coverage was considered in Miques v. Universal
Airways.3 79 In Miques the insurer took the position that failure
of the insured air taxi operator to comply with certain CAB
economic regulations and FAA safety regulations (regarding
the operation of the aircraft) excluded coverage. The Miques
court held that compulsory liability insurance provisions
under the CAB and FAA regulations are intended for the
protection of the public, and coverage of liability claims aris-
ing from injury to the public may not be denied for failure of
the insured to comply with economic or safety regulations.38 °
Furthermore, the court added that only where the loss in
question involved the insured's property, and not liability for
injury to the public, would liability under the policy be
excluded. 1
D. Lienholders' Endorsements
Three cases involving coverage for lienholders were de-
cided during the survey period. In Aero International v. United
States Fire Insurance Co. ,312 the Fifth Circuit held that
lienholders' endorsements do not create a new contract but
add a party to the original insurance contract, and that the
coverage is limited to the same risks insured under the origi-
. 643 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982), rev'd, 18 Av. Gas. (CCH) 17,806 (Tex.
1984).
:70 Id at 516.
:,7 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,250 (S.D. Miss. 1982). The policy expressly stated in the
Standard Endorsement that such endorsement was attached in order to comply with
the provisions of § 298 of the Economic Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Id at 17,253. See 14 C.F.R. § 298 (1984).
Id at 17,253-55.
Id.
3.. 18 Av. Gas. (CCH) 17,125 (5th Cir. 1983).
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nal insurance contract. Similarly, in Lakewood Bank and Trust
v. Security Insurance Co.,383 a Texas federal court held that the
coverage provided to a lienholder under the lienholder's en-
dorsement does not expand the coverage to risks which are
not covered under the basic coverage.
In Northeastern Flyers v. Olson Brothers,384 the Eighth Circuit
held that, for purposes of insurance coverage, title to an air-
craft passes under the U.C.C. at the time of delivery of the
aircraft, regardless of whether the bill of sale or application
for registration has been delivered or filed in the FAA Air-
craft Registry. This case is similar to cases arising under poli-
cies of motor vehicle insurance where the requirements of
motor vehicle certificate-of-title statutes generally need not
be met in order to find that there has been a valid sale for
purposes of determining whether coverage is provided under
the seller's or buyer's insurance policy.
3 5
E. Miscellaneous
In Tadday v. National Aviation Underwriters,31 6 the Wyoming
Supreme Court held that, under the doctrines of waiver and
estoppel, an insurer's settlement of a hull claim under a pol-
icy did not bar the right of the insurer to contest coverage for
a liability claim arising from the same accident. The court
stated that waiver and estoppel are applicable only where
there is an alleged forfeiture by the insured, followed by a
waiver by the insurer.387 Forfeiture was not an issue in
Tadday.
In Fiueroa v. United States,388 a federal district court in Pu-
erto Rico addressed the question of apportionment between
insurance policies. One of the policies considered in Fgueroa
contained an excess insurance clause while the other con-
tained a pro rata clause. The court determined that the pol-
- 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,611 (N.D. Tex. 1981), afd, 690 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1982).
:18 679 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1982).
:- See generally 6 B. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4313 at 335-36
(1979).
:- 660 P.2d 1148 (Wyo. 1983).
:17 Id. at 1150-51.
1 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,785 (D.P.R. 1983).
1984]
768 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
icy with the pro rata clause was the primary policy but added
that the pro rata clause did not apply without other "valid
and collectible" insurance. The court continued, stating that
the secondary policy, because of its excess insurance clause,
was not "valid and collectible" until the primary policy was
exhausted.18 9 The court, in effect, disregarded the pro rata
clause of the primary policy ordering compensation from this
policy alone until the policy limits were met.39 °
IX. DAMAGES
A. Elements of Damages
In the area of damages, the question of whether pre-impact
pain and suffering are compensable in wrongful death actions
arising from aviation accidents was addressed. In Hurst Avia-
tion V. Junell,39 ' a Texas court of appeals held that evidence of
only two seconds between a mid-air collision and impact with
the ground was sufficient to support an award of $20,000 for
pre-impact mental anguish. The court reiterated that the
consciousness of approaching death is a proper element to be
considered in evaluating mental anguish under Texas law.392
B. Calculation of Damages
A case which demonstrates both the delay and also the ul-
timate adaptability of our legal system to the purposes of
proper compensation for victims of air crash accidents, and
provides a fitting conclusion to this survey of recent develop-
ments in aviation case law is Friends for All Children v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp.393 In Friends the court approved the creation of
a "central trust" from the proceeds of the settlement of the
cases for the purpose of providing funds for the continued
medical expenses predicted for the children who survived the
C-5A accident in Viet Nam during the evacuation of that
- Id. at 17,787.
' Id at 17,788.
642 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
",' Id at 859.
18 Av. Gas. (CCH) 17,383 (D.D.C. 1982).
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country.319 The court noted that this settlement on behalf of
all of the survivors was reached in 1979 after trials of ten
cases resulted in disparate verdicts from zero to $1,000,000 in
individual cases for children who, according to experts, had
approximately the same risk of crash-related symptoms. 3 95
The court further noted that no insurance alternatives to the
"central trust" were available in the current market, but that
the trustee would be instructed to periodically review the pos-
sibility of insurance alternatives.396
In approving the trust, the court carefully considered, but
chose not to follow, the views of some parents and their attor-
neys in favor of a lump sum payment. These persons ex-
pressed concerns ranging from costs of administration of the
trust to the objections of one counsel based on an "expensive,
unwarranted invasion of [his client's] property and privacy
rights. '397 Instead, the court followed the views of parents
who, although concerned about the expense of administra-
tion, agreed to the trust "for the protection of those children,
if any, whose needs come to exceed the resources of their fam-
ilies," and others who were "satisfied that the Parent Advi-
sory committee and the Guardian Ad Litem have acted in
the best interest of all and that the Central Trust concept is
the answer to future contingencies. "398
.Id at 17,387.
" Id. at 17,386-87.
'. Id at 17,386.
**98 Id
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